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The Fourth Amendment and the
"Legitimate Expectation of
Privacy"
Gerald G. Ashdown*
I. INTRODUCTION

Judicial supervision of police practices has always necessitated
a rather delicate balance. To the extent societal crime control values are served, privacy and individual rights may, on balance, have
to be compromised. On the other hand, effective law enforcement
cannot be held absolutely sacrosanct at the expense of individual
privacy interests. The dilemma thus created is one of providing the
maximum possible accommodation to one interest without unduly
infringing upon the other.1
The protection of individual privacy interests in this confrontation with crime detection practices requires either the benefit of
benevolent governmental self-restraint or some superimposed legal
barrier protecting citizens from government overreaching. Given
the strong governmental interest in suppressing antisocial conduct,
in the form of both crime and perceived subversion, governmental
self-control is unlikely to be exercised. Thus, the enforcement of
some formal legal mechanism generally is necessary to insulate individual privacy from unrestrained official intrusion. Fortunately,
the founders of the American democratic system were aware of the
need for this legal protection. The basis of our constitutional government consequently contains as one of its basic principles "[t]he
right of the people to be secure.
' '2
and seizures.

. .

against unreasonable searches

* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. B.B.A., 1969, J.D., 1972,

University of Iowa.
1. See generally Griffiths, Ideology in CriminalProcedureor a Third "Model" of the
CriminalProcess, 79 YALZ L.J. 359 (1970); Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess,
113 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1 (1964).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text of the fourth amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
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The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides the judiciary with the power to protect individual freedom
and privacy from governmental encroachment. The trouble is, of
course, that the language of the fourth amendment is far from explicit. This lack of guidance places upon the courts the sociopolitical burden of balancing the individual's interest against the governmental interest in effective and efficient law enforcement.3
Judicial response to the dilemma has encompassed vicissitudinous
movements between the political left and right-waverings that
generally dictate the prevailing political climate. At no time was
this problem more evident than in the 1970s, a decade in which an
aroused interest in law and order, followed by a general political
trend to the right, resulted in a renewed tolerance for police practices at the expense of individual rights.4
The United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren
Burger is attuned to this apparent sociopolitical sentiment.5 Although the record of the Court in the decade of the seventies has
been mixed-both generally' and in the area of criminal law in
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Although it is possible to argue that the amendment was directed at relatively identifiable
historical abuses, its philosophy and function transcend history. The fourth amendment
currently stands as the primary means of monitoring and controlling police behavior. See
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 362-80, 397-402
(1974).
3. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 353-55.
4. The late Professor Herbert Packer referred to this political fluctuation and the resulting dichotomy in philosophies as expressing "two models of the criminal process." Packer's crime control model favors efficiency and informal procedures, and his due process
model stresses formal, adversary factfinding and individual rights. See Packer, supra note 1,
at 9-23.
5. Between 1969 and 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, who held an avowed crime
control philosophy, appointed four new Justices to the United States Supreme Court- Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger (1969); Justice Harry A. Blackmun (1970); Justice Lewis F. Powell
(1972); and Justice William H. Rehnquist (1972).
6. Compare, for example, the decisions issued during the last week of the Court's
1979-1980 term: Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(Secretary of Labor's occupational safety and health standard that limited employee exposure to benzene held invalid); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
(first amendment held to provide an implicit public right of access to criminal trials); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (provision of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, requiring 10% of the public construction funds disbursed under the Act to go to minority contractors held valid); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980)
(congressional abrogation of Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 granting the Sioux indian nation
seven million acres of the Black Hills in South Dakota constituted a "taking" that required
compensation under the fifth amendment); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (state
statute excluding most abortions from Medicaid coverage upheld against constitutional and
statutory challenges); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (federal "Hyde Amendment"
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particular 7 -the Court's philosophical predilection is unambiguous
toward police practices under the fourth amendment. s In the 197576 term, for example, the Supreme Court reversed nine consecutive
lower federal or state court decisions upholding fourth amendment
claims.9 The Court thereby validated the law enforcement activities that had been found to be illegal by those courts. In fact, except for several border patrol decisions, 10 the Supreme Court beexcluding most abortions from Medicaid coverage upheld against challenges based on both
the Constitution and Title XIX of the Social Security Act).
7. Compare Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (holding that investigation
within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona includes any words or actions reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (subtle interrogation held to violate in-custody defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (shifting of burden of proof of essential elements of offense to
defendant held impermissible); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (pretrial restraint held
to require judicial determination of probable cause); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (parolee facing possible parole revocation held entitled to due process); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (indigent misdemeanants facing possible incarceration held entitled to counsel); Papachriston v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance held
unconstitutionally vague); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (loitering ordinance
held unconstitutionally vague); and cases cited note 12 infra with Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980) (application of habitual offender statute to nonviolent, property offenses
held not to violate eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment);
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (witness spouse alone held to have right to
exercise privilege of refusing to testify against defendant spouse); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492 (1977) (Miranda's "custodial interrogation" given narrow construction); United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (grand jury witness held not entitled to Miranda
warnings); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (indigent state defendants' right to counsel
held not applicable to discretionary appeals); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973)
(instruction that knowledge can be inferred from possession of stolen property held valid);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements taken in violation of Miranda held
admissible for impeachment purposes); and cases cited notes 9 & 11 infra.
8. See Israel, CriminalProcedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 MICH.L. Rv. 1319, 1366-1416 (1977); Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment:
Time to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio?, 27 CATH. U.L. REv. 9, 10-12 (1977). The other area in
which the Supreme Court's policy preference clearly appears is in its first amendment decisions restricting freedom of the press. See, e.g., Ashdown, EditorialPrivilege and Freedom
of the Press: Herbert v. Lando in Perspective, 51 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 303, 303-12 (1980). But
see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
9. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38 (1976); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). These decisions led Justice Brennan to
exclaim in dissent in Martinez-Fuertethat "[t]oday's decision is the ninth this Term marking the continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 428 U.S. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The
thrust of these decisions was to impose some restrictions upon the border patrol's authority
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tween 1972 and 1976 decided nineteen consecutive cases in favor of
law enforcement entities and against parties asserting fourth
amendment claims. 1 Even though this trend has moderated somewhat,12 the Court remains generally unsympathetic toward parties
challenging police search and seizure practices.'3
This bent appears to be a direct result of the Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule.' 4 Although unable to muster the
majority required to overrule Mapp v. Ohio,I5 the Court consistto stop automobiles coming into the country from Mexico and to search them for drugs and
illegal aliens.
11. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 .U.S. 291 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972); cases cited note 9 supra.
12. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrant held necessary to
make nonexigent arrest in private dwelling); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (specific,
articulable facts held necessary to justify weapons frisk in possible criminal situation because fourth amendment does not permit evidentiary searches of bystanders present at the
execution of a search warrant); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (probable cause
held necessary to detain suspect for questioning); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)
(police officer's arbitrary, random stops of vehicles for license and registration checks held
impermissible); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (provision of Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 authorizing warrantless inspections held violative of the
fourth amendment); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (warrant held necessary
to search locked footlocker).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Savucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (automatic standing held
not available to defendant charged with possessory offense); United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727 (1980) (use of supervisory power held ineffective to exclude evidence seized illegally
from third party who lacks standing); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally
seized evidence held admissible to impeach false testimony given in response to cross-examination); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (satisfaction of some characteristics of "drug courier profile" held to justify investigatory stop); United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463 (1980) (illegal arrest held not to taint in-court identification); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979) (strip searches and body cavity inspections of pretrial detainees following
contact visits with outsiders held not unreasonable); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238
(1979) (covert entry to install electronic eavesdropping equipment held permissible); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (fourth amendment held inapplicable to recording of
phone numbers dialed from a particular telephone); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978) (warrant authorized search of newspaper office for evidence held permissible even
though no one at newspaper suspected of wrongdoing); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106 (1977) (specific, articulable facts held unnecessary for police officer to order stopped
motorist out of vehicle).
14. See Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of
an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 160, 186 (1979); Kaplan, The
Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. Rzv. 1027, 1038, 1047 (1974); McMillian, Is
There Anything Left of the FourthAmendment?, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1979); Trager
& Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 BRooKLYN L. Rxv.
421, 453 (1975).
15. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Should a change in the exclusionary rule occur, it is more
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ently has ruled on fourth amendment claims in a manner that
thwarts the operation of the rule. The Court has utilitized two basic doctrinal devices in this effort, both of which have been applied
with questionable validity. First, the Supreme Court has focused
narrowly on the exclusionary rule's deterrent function as virtually
its sole justification. Acknowledging only this limited rationale for
the rule permits the Court to refuse to apply it in cases in which
its application will provide no additional deterrent to unlawful police behavior, or when any marginal deterrent value attained is
outweighed by the societal interest in admitting reliable evidence.16
This Article does not endeavor to engage in a debate over the efficacy or deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.' Nevertheless, it
likely to be a modification similar to the "good faith" exception suggested by Justice White
in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting), rather than outright
abolition as suggested by Chief Justice Burger in Stone, 428 U.S. at 496-502 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring), and in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In his Stone concurrence, the Chief Justice does seem willing to compromise on some modification of the exclusionary rule. See also
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (evidence admissible because of arresting officer's
good faith reliance on validity of city ordinance); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830
(5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (adopting a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 946 (1981); Kaplan, supra note 14, at 1046-49 (suggesting limitation
of the exclusionary rule).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (court's use of its supervisory power to exclude evidence held improper when defendant lacked standing to invoke
fourth amendment exclusionary rule); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally obtained evidence held admissible to impeach testimony given in response to proper
cross-examination); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (automobile passenger possessed
no fourth amendment protection against police search of the vehicle); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus jurisdiction limited when state provided full and fair
review of fourth amendment claims); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (exclusionary rule held inapplicable to federal civil tax suit); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974) (exclusionary rule held inapplicable to grand jury proceedings); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (standing required to challenge admissibility of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970)
(consideration of illegally obtained evidence in sentencing process held not improper), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971). See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements
obtained in violation of Miranda held admissible for impeachment purposes); Burkoff,
supra note 14.
17. For vigorous debate over the viability of the exclusionary rule, see Canon, Is the
Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous
Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or
"Unnatural" Interpretationof the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JuD. 66 (1978); McMillian,
supra note 14; Miles, supra note 8; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970); Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974); Spiotto,
Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?,
62 JuD. 214 (1978).
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should be noted that these decisions appear questionable. It seems
clear that a refusal to apply the rule in cases of particular fourth
amendment transgressions will produce no incremental deterrence
of unlawful police conduct, and inconsistent application of the rule
arguably could diminish whatever deterrent value does exist.
Therefore, if deterrence is viewed as the primary-if not
only-function of the exclusionary rule, that goal should be promoted through thorough and consistent application of the rule.
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to adopt this policy and
instead has isolated the rule's deterrent aspect as a means to circumvent the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment.
The second doctrinal device upon which the Supreme Court
has relied to restrict the scope of the fourth amendment and the
exclusion of evidence in criminal trials ironically emanates from
Katz v. United States.18 In Katz a majority19 of seven Justices
under Chief Justice Earl Warren focused on the protection of privacy interests rather than property rights in expanding the scope
of the fourth amendment to cover electronic eavesdropping. 0 The
Burger Court, however, has utilized this same privacy concept to
limit both the application of the fourth amendment and the operation of the exclusionary rule to those situations in which an individual's expectations of privacy are considered by the Court to be
either "legitimate" or "reasonable.

' 21

This limitation in turn has

resulted in the development of a new graduated approach to the
fourth amendment that is based on the recognition of degrees of
privacy expectations. Under the new approach constitutional protection decreases as the individual's privacy interests become less
legitimate on the Court's hierarchy. Unfortunately, a majority of
the Court has allowed either dissatisfaction with the exclusionary
rule or a desire to accommodate state and local law enforcement to
distort its perception of which privacy expectations are justifiable
and deserving of protection. Thus, the development of a graduated
approach to privacy expectations under the Burger Court concomi18.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).

19. Justice Black filed the only dissent. Justice Marshall did not take part in the
decision.
20. The Court held that the use of a listening device placed outside the telephone
booth being used by petitioner violated an area in which petitioner enjoyed a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The invasion thus violated the fourth amendment, even though there
was no trespass or invasion of a property interest. Id. at 359.
21. See notes 76-100 infra and accompanying text.
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tantly has resulted in a dangerous narrowing of the fourth amendment's substantive scope. This development suggests that criminal
defendants may be better off without the federal exclusionary remedy than without a viable fourth amendment to supervise police
practices, assuming that the two are pragmatically separable.2 2 It is

with this proposition in mind that this Article examines the formulation and use of the concept of a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in fourth amendment adjudication.
II. A GRADUATED APPROACH TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A.

The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Methodology

Since its earliest encounters with the fourth amendment, 3 the
Supreme Court rather consistently has analyzed and applied the
amendment's protections from a personal, individual rights perspective rather than from a regulatory standpoint.2 4 The Court, for
example, acknowledges an individual's standing to raise a fourth
amendment challenge only when the rights of that individual have
been invaded.2 5 Thus, in Alderman v. United States,2 a a case
which dealt with standing to challenge illegal electronic surveillance, the Court stated that "Fourth Amendment rights are per22. This proposition again raises the debate over the viability of the exclusionary rule.
See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
23. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (invalidating subpeona duces tecum for the delivery of private documents); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878) (invalidating postal regulations that permitted the warrantless inspection of letters and packages).
This Article makes no attempt to trace the history and development of the fourth amendment; the task has been amply and aptly done by others. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note
2; Israel, supra note 8; Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the FourthAmendment and
Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. Rv. 1 (1975); Miles, supra note 8;
Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. Ray.
173; Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 14.
24. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 367-69. Professor Amsterdam characterizes the
prevailing view of the fourth amendment as "a collection of protections of atomistic spheres
of interest of individual citizens" rather than "a regulation of governmental conduct," id. at
367, and uses a rather effective example to illustrate the difference. For an illustration of the
use of the regulatory approach in relation to the fifth and sixth amendments, see Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
25. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Also worthy of note is the case
of Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907), in which the Court stated that remedies for violations of constitutional rights would only be provided to a person who "belongs to the class
for whose sake the constitutional protection is given." Id. at 160. In Jones v. United States
the Court held this principle applicable in determining the availability of the exclusionary
rule to redress fourth amendment violations. 362 U.S. at 261.
26. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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may not be vicariously asserted.

'27

Since

the regulatory view focuses on the police practice in question
rather than on whether a particular individual's rights have been
violated, it would seem apropos for the Court to shift to a regulatory perspective at a time when the deterrent aspects of the exclusionary rule are being emphasized. Instead, the Court has reaffirmed its position that fourth amendment interests are personals2 8
and it thus has restricted the amendment's protection to those
cases in which the defendant's own rights are violated.2 9
Moreover, an additional jurisprudential dichotomy exists
within this personal rights view. It is possible to conceptualize the
fourth amendment either as a hard-and-fast, monolithic proposition or as a variable and flexible provision that operates in degrees.30 Under the former view the amendment applies wholesale
or not at all; the latter approach, on the other hand, utilizes a sliding scale of protection based on the personal interest and law enforcement practice involved.
The Supreme Court has employed, at least to some extent,
both models. Generally, the Court has held the full extent of the
fourth amendment, including the warrant requirement, to be applicable 1 subject to a few recognized exceptions.32 In an approach
that originated in Camara v. Municipal Court33 in 1967 and matured a year later in Terry v. Ohio,3 however, the Court began to
look upon the fourth amendment as a more flexible provision capable of being applied on a graduated basis. In Camara the Court
utilized the reasonableness clause to alter the probable cause re27.
28.

Id. at 174. See also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973).
See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439

U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
29. See note 28 supra. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Indeed, it can be argued that the Supreme Court's narrow
conception of personal rights and expectations of privacy actually has undermined the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. See text accompanying notes 269-71 infra.
30. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 388-95.
31. The cases in which the Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment does
not apply at all are those in which it concluded that no search or seizure had occurred. See
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 43132 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 310-12 (1966).

32. The established exceptions to the warrant requirements include the following.
stop-and-frisk; search incident to arrest; plain view, hot pursuit; exigent circumstances; and
consent.
33. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
34. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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quirement for the issuance of an administrative search warrant,'s
and in Terry the majority focused exclusively on the reasonableness language of the amendment to validate a warrantless stopand-frisk on less than probable clause. 6 Since Camara and Terry
the Court has relied on the reasonableness provision of the fourth
amendment to limit search and seizure protection in cases of traffic
arrests3 7 and border patrol practices,3 8 to permit warrantless ad-

ministrative inspections, 9 to permit detention without probable
cause of persons found at the scene of a search warrant's execution,40

and otherwise

to

validate

various

law

enforcement

activities.41
35. 387 U.S. at 539. See also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
36. In Terry the Supreme Court for the first time clearly separated the warrant clause
of the fourth amendment from the provision proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures.
392 U.S. at 20-27.
37. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (authorizing police officer to
order motorist stopped for traffic violation out of the vehicle without the necessity of any
suspicion whatsoever); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (permitting a full search of
a person after a lawful custodial traffic arrest); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) (permitting a full search of a person after a lawful custodial traffic arrest). A contrary
holding can be found in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), in which the Supreme
Court held that random vehicle stops for license and registration checks violate the fourth
amendment. It is significant to note, however, that the Court did not intend to invalidate
fixed checkpoint inspections when all vehicles are stopped. 440 U.S. at 663; accord, United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-60 (1976).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (authorizing the
border patrol's routine stopping of a vehicle at a permanent checkpoint without the necessity of individualized suspicion that the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (validating roving border patrol stops without
the necessity of probable cause when specific, articuable facts exist indicating that a vehicle
may contain illegal aliens). For decisions that restrict the border patrol's authority to make
a full automobile search without probable cause, see United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891
(1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 226 (1973).
39. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (investigation by fire chief during
or soon after fire's extinguishment); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (inspection by federal treasury agent of premises owned by licensed gun dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (inspection by federal treasury agent of
premises owned by licensed liquor dealers); cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home
visitation by caseworker of welfare recipients). But see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978) (invalidating inspections of work areas by Occupational Safety and Health Administration officials made without an administrative warrant). See also Marshall v.
Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1979) (routine warrantless inspections held
reasonable in mining industry), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980); Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry
Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979) (warrantless inspections of mines held reasonable in coal industry), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
40. Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (implicitly legitimizing
FAA "hijacking proffle"); Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (authorizing covert
entry to install electronic bugging equipment); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
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Until fairly recently this flexible approach had been utilized
rather narrowly to define and delimit police activity that was permissible within the scope of the fourth amendment. In other
words, the Supreme Court used the graduated model to establish a
level of acceptable police practices that were consistent with the
language and oversight of the Constitution. With the 1978 decision
in Rakas v. Illinois,42 however, a new and much broader graduated
theory of the fourth amendment began to crystallize, the application of which determines the actual scope of the amendment itself
as a control on police behavior. Instead of merely determining the
legality of particular police practices within the confines of the
fourth amendment, this emergent theory effectively frees law enforcement personnel in certain situations from any fourth amendment control, or at least substantially reduces the amendment's supervisory value. That is to say, whereas the Supreme Court
formerly had applied the sliding scale approach only to establish
permissible police conduct within the bounds of fourth amendment
requirements, the new approach works to determine the
scope-and therefore the application-of the fourth amendment
itself as a control on this conduct.
The new theory takes Katz v. United State843 as its foundation and thus relies on the rubric of privacy to determine the reach
of the fourth amendment as a check on the conduct of law enforcement officials. It will be recalled that it was in Katz that the Supreme Court developed the notion that the fourth amendment protects privacy rather than property, and it was this "expectation of
privacy" concept that the Court utilized during the 1970s to formulate a graduated scope of fourth amendment protection.
B. Formulation of the Privacy Model
Although commentators credit Katz with having clearly established the shift from a property to a privacy model of the fourth
(1976) (validating police inventory searches of impounded vehicles); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (extending permissible time frame for search incident to arrest);
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (validating physical examination of murder suspect
prior to arrest).
Recently, several lower courts have also relied upon the fourth amendments reasonableness clause. See United States v. Benjamin, 29 CmrM. L. Rm. (BNA) 2090 (7th Cir. Mar.
26, 1981) (reasonable suspicion justifies seizure and detention of suspect's briefcase until a
warrant can be obtained); United States v. West, 29 Cinm. L. REP. (BNA) 2322 (1st Cir.
June 16, 1981) (reasonable suspicion supports detention of traveler's suitcase).
42. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
43. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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amendment, the privacy concept actually has a more detailed and
complex history. In the 1961 decision in Silverman v. United
States44 the Supreme Court expressed dissatisfaction with the
views espoused in Olmstead v. United States' 4 and Goldman v.
United States,4" cases in which fourth amendment protection was
limited to property interests.47 In Silverman the Court held testimony about conversations overheard through a foot-long spike
mike installed in an adjoining wall to be inadmissible. The
microphone made contact with a heating duct, which permitted officers to overhear conversations taking place throughout the premises. There was certainly no effective infringement of a property
interest under these facts, and even though there may have been a
technical violation of a property right, the Court nevertheless
stated that the "decision [did] not turn upon the technicality of a
trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law, ' " s and that
"Fourth Amendment rights [were] not inevitably measurable in
terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.""9 A few
years later in Clinton v. Virginia,50 the Court, in a per curiam
opinion citing Silverman, reversed a conviction in which a listening
device has been tacked onto an adjoining wall but did not penetrate the defendant's premises. Thus, Silverman and Clinton
clearly foreshadowed the demise of the property rationale.51
The actual death knell came in 1967 when the Court in Warden v. Hayden52 rejected the notion that the government could be
prohibited from seizing "mere evidence," items which are not contraband or instrumentalities of crime, because of a superior personal property interest. The Court stated in unambiguous language
that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protec44. 365 U.s. 505 (1961).
45.
46.

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
316 U.S. 129 (1942).

47. The decisions in Olmstead and Goldman generally are regarded as the archetypes
of the property-oriented view of the fourth amendment. The Court held in both cases that
the fourth amendment did not apply to electronic surveillance since there was no physical
trespass and, therefore, no search.
48. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
49. Id. at 511.
50.

377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam).

51. It is possible to interpret the Supreme Court's earliest encounters with the fourth
amendment as attempts to protect privacy as well as property interests. The Court's fourth
amendment decisions thus can be seen as a pendulum swinging between privacy and property perspectives. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
52.

387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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tion of privacy rather than property," 53 and that "[p]rivacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object
than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband."" Early the following term, the Court overruled Olinstead and Goldman, holding in Katz that the fourth amendment
protects people and not merely places. Justice Stewart's majority
opinion, which focused on the existence of a justifiable expectation
of privacy,5 5 was to become the benchmark of fourth amendment
adjudication in the 1970s.
At the same time that substantive fourth amendment law was
developing into a privacy model, the Supreme Court also began to
view the procedural notion of standing from a privacy perspective.
In 1960 the Court in Jones v. United States" rejected the government's argument that the petitioner lacked standing to challenge
the admissibility of evidence because he had failed to allege either
ownership of the seized articles or an interest greater than that of
a guest in the apartment searched. Although the prevailing view in
the lower courts had been that some property interest was necessary to confer standing, Justice Frankfurter's opinion stated that
the "Fourth Amendment [was] a means for making effective the
protection of privacy, '57 and that it was
unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of the law, had
been shaped by distinctions whose validity [was] largely historical.58

The Court then held that anyone legitimately on premises where a
search occurs has standing to invoke the privacy of the premises
searched.5 9
In the years following the Jones decision, the Supreme Court
approached subsequent standing cases from a privacy perspec53. Id. at 304.
54. Id. at 301-02.
55. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). See also id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
56. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
57. Id. at 261.
58. Id. at 266.
59. Id. at 267. Interestingly, the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978), relied on a privacy analysis to limit this aspect of the Jones holding. The other basis
on which standing was granted in Jones-automaticstanding in the case of possessory offenses-was rejected in the recent case of United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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tive.6 0 In Mancusi v. DeForte, l for example, the Court granted
standing to a union official to challenge the seizure of union
records from an office he shared with several other persons. The
Court stated that the "capacity to claim the protection of the
[fourth] [a]mendment depends not upon a property right in the
invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there
was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion."6 2
In addition to applying a privacy formula to questions of
standing, the Supreme Court, in the ten years after Katz, continued to apply the same concept to determine the substantive scope
of the fourth amendment.6 s This parallel development of substantive and procedural fourth amendment law under the same jurisprudential mold finally coalesced in 1978 in Rakas v. Illinois." In
Rakas a passenger challenged the warrantless search of the automobile in which he was riding. The car was stopped following a
radio report describing the getaway car used in a robbery. The
search produced a box of rifle shells found in the locked glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle found under the front passenger
seat. The Illinois courts denied standing to the petitioners, who
had not claimed an interest in either the searched automobile or
the seized items, 5 on the ground that a mere passenger "without a
proprietary or other similar interest in an automobile... lacks
standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle."6 6
In the United States Supreme Court the petitioners argued
that they had standing under Jones "since they were 'legitimately
on the premises' at the time of the search. '6 Justice Rehnquist's
60. See, e.g., Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 179 n.11 (1969); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); cf.
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (petitioners lacked standing because they failed
to allege or prove a legitimate privacy interest in the store of a coconspirator).
61. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
62. Id. at 368.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410
U.S. 19 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968).
64.
65.
66.
U.S. 128
67.

439 U.S. 128 (1978).
See id. at 130. See also notes 164-214 infra and accompanying text.
People v. Rakas, 46 MI1.App. 3d 569, 571, 360 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (1977), afl'd, 439
(1978).
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 (1978). See also id. at 140-41. Rakas also
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majority opinion, which rejected the Jones standard as too broad,
questioned "whether it serve[d] any useful analytical purpose to
consider [the] principle ... of standing ... distinct from the mer-

its of a defendant's Fourth Amendment claim."'8 The majority
concluded that "the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing," 69 and that the "definition of those
rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive
Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. 7 0 The Court

then relied on Katz to hold that the proper inquiry for delimiting
the scope of fourth amendment protection is whether the defendant has a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place
searched. The majority went on to conclude, somewhat surprisingly, that passengers in an automobile enjoy no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle;7 1 therefore, a search of the car did
not violate any rights of the petitioners.
In addition to combining the notion of standing with substantive fourth amendment law under the "legitimate expectation of
privacy" formula, the Court in Rakas also reaffirmed that such expectations-and thus the scope of fourth amendment rights-are
dependent upon what a majority of the Court chooses to recognize
as constitutionally legitimate.72 This approach has permitted the
Court to develop a new graduated view of fourth amendment
rights in which some expectations of privacy are less legitimate-and thus less entitled to protection-than others. While
finding privacy expectations to be clearly legitimate in some situaclaimed standing on the ground that he was the "target" of the search. The Supreme Court
rejected this so-called "target theory," reasoning that it was inconsistent with the personal
rights view of the fourth amendment, see text accompanying notes 23-29 supra, and that it
would not further the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule. 439 U.S. at 133-38.
68. 439 U.S. at 138-39.
69. Id. at 139.
70. Id. at 140.
71. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, actually concluded that petitioners
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the car searched in that
case-the glove compartment and the area under the front passenger seat. He also indicated
that a passenger would have no privacy interest in the trunk. Id. at 148-49. If a passenger in
an automobile does not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in these areas, however, it
is difficult to imagine any part of a vehicle where such an expectation would exist.
72. See id. at 142-49. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan was
the first to suggest that for an expectation of privacy to be protected, it must "be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id.
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tions73 and completely absent in others,74 the Court also has cho-

sen to recognize a middle ground, predominantly in cases that deal
with automobiles, in which privacy expectations are diminished
and fourth amendment protection is concomitantly reduced.7 5
Thus, the Burger Court's view of the fourth amendment, although
perhaps still in its incipient stages, appears to be reducible to a
three-tiered hierarchical scheme, with protection being dependent
upon the Court's willingness to recognize asserted privacy interests
as either legitimate, diminished, or altogether nonexistent.
When the Court is willing to recognize a claimed privacy interest as legitimate, full fourth amendment safeguards, including both
the probable cause and warrant requirements, are applicable. In
other words, the Court demands strict compliance with the fourth
amendment's warrant clause in these cases. In United States v.
Chadwick,8 for example, the government argued that the fourth
amendment warrant clause protected only those interests traditionally associated with the home. Chief Justice Burger's majority
opinion, however, stated that "a fundamental purpose of the
Fourth Amendment [was] to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests, and not
'7
simply those interests found inside the four walls of the home."
The Chief Justice concluded that the users of a locked footlocker,
which was characterized as a repository of personal effects, enjoyed
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the locker,
and that the warrant clause therefore applied. In a later case the
Court held that the same privacy expectations and warrant requirement applied to an unlocked suitcase found in an automobile,
even though automobiles themselves traditionally had been provided with less fourth amendment protection.78 Recently, a plurality of the Court in Robbins v. California9 expanded these holdings
to apply to any closed, opaque container.80 Other privacy interests
that the Court has found to be legitimate and thus governed by the
warrant clause include those associated with the home,81 packaged
73. See notes 76-83 infra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 103-16 infra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 84-100 infra and accompanying text.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
each of
81.

433 U.S. 1 (1977).

Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
The containers in Robbins were two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic,
which contained 15 pounds of marijuana. Id. at 2844.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct.
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films,8 2 and telephone booths.8 3

The second level in the new hierarchy of fourth amendment
interests comprises those cases in which the Court has concluded
that the privacy expectation in question is diminished or reduced.
This category apparently is governed by the fourth amendment's
reasonableness clause rather than its warrant clause. Thus, in a
relatively recent line of cases, the Court has held warrantless
searches of automobiles to be reasonable on the ground that any
expectation of privacy in a car is diminished.8 The Court has justified this conclusion in a variety of ways, reasoning that
automobiles, unlike houses, are constantly used in plain view for
transportation,85 are extensively regulated by the state,86 are often
subject to official inspection, and are frequently taken into police
87
custody.
Another area of police activity to which the Court applies this
second category of diminished privacy expectations is public arrests. Although it was not specifically stated in Watson v. United
States,8 a case upholding the validity of warrantless public arrests, a majority of the Justices apparently felt that privacy expectations.are diminished when a person is in public.89 Juxtaposing
1642 (1981).
82. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
83. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
84. The original justification for warrantless automobile searches was the inherent mobility of cars and the potential loss of evidence. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 459-60 (1971) (holding warrantless search unreasonable because police had ample
opportunity to obtain a warrant for the search of the automobile). Later decisions by the
Supreme Court, which validated these warrantless searches even when vehicles were under
police control and thus immobilized, required a shift to the new rationale based on a diminished privacy interest in an automobile. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13
(1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); cf. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1979) (reasons supporting the warrantless search of an automobile are inapplicable to searches of personal
luggage taken from that automobile).
85. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
86. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
87. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976). See also United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (listing all of these factors).
88. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
89. The precedential and historical justification for warrantless public arrests, coupled
with congressional approval of such arrests, was the actual articulated basis of the Watson
decision. As Justice Marshall asserts in dissent, however, the precedential and historical
foundations of the holding are tenuous at best. He states that the correct constitutional
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United States v. Santana"° with Payton v. New York91 makes it
even more clear that this was the implication intended by the
Court in Watson. In Santana the Court upheld the warrantless arrest of a defendant who had been standing in the doorway to her
home. The majority concluded that since the defendant was not in
an area where she had any expectation of privacy, the situation
was governed by Watson. The Payton Court, on the other hand,
stressed individual privacy to invalidate a warrantless arrest made
in a private dwelling, declaring that in no setting "is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home. 9' 2 Although Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Santana stated that the defendant lacked an expectation of privacy while in the doorway of
her home, he undoubtedly meant that her expectation of privacy
merely was diminished, since public arrests, unlike other situations
in which the Court has found a complete absence of privacy interests,9" are governed by the fourth amendment probable cause requirement. 9 4 That a person retains some privacy interest in his
"9 5
person when he appears in public was indicated in Terry v. Ohio,
approach in such cases is and has been to balance the privacy interest in question against
the law enforcement interest. Id. at 436-45. This approach in all likelihood, is the unarticulated analysis that underlies the majority's decision in Watson, namely that the privacy
interest was insufficient to be entitled to the protection of the warrant clause.

90. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
91. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
92. Id. at 589. The Court reaffirmed the sanctity of the home this past term-in Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981), holding that both a search warrant and an
arrest warrant are necessary to enter the home of a third party and make an arrest. The
Court stressed the different kinds of probable cause necessary to support a search warrant
as opposed to an arrest warrant. It concluded that the former determination is sufficient to
secure the privacy of a home that belongs to an individual not named in any arrest warrant
from official abuse.
Two things should be noted about the Steagald decision. First, it provides no additional
protection to an arrested party, since he has no expectation of privacy in the home of another. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106-10 (1980); notes 222-23 infra. In Steagald
it was the actual homeowner who was objecting to the entry and search. Second, the decision might not provide much protection even for the property owner because the Court in
Steagald specifically relied upon the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant
requirement. 101 S.Ct. at 1649.
93. See notes 103-16 infra and accompanying text.
94. Although it did not deal with the question specifically, the Court upheld the warrantless arrests in both Watson and Santana because of the existence of probable cause.
Probable cause has been recognized both historically and consistently as a necessary prerequisite to a full custodial arrest. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
95. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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in which the Court noted that the fourth amendment applies
whenever an individual harbors a reasonable expectation of privacy. "Unquestionably," the Court stated, "petitioner was entitled
to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the
street in Cleveland."9 6
It can be seen from the Court's treatment of public arrests and
vehicular searches that in those cases in which the new notion of
diminished privacy expectations applies, generally only probable
cause, and not a warrant, is required. In a few instances, however,
the Supreme Court has relied on its diminished expectations rationale to justify a law enforcement practice even when probable
cause was absent. Examples of this can be found in South Dakota
v. Opperman97 and Bell v. Wolfish." In Opperman the Court relied on the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle to hold
that a police inventory search without probable cause of an automobile that had been impounded for multiple parking violations
was not "unreasonable." Similarly, in Bell the Court found that
any privacy expectation of pretrial detainees necessarily is diminished-and thus outweighed-by the need of the institution to
conduct strip searches following contact visits. The Court concluded that these searches, including body cavity inspections, are
reasonable under the fourth amendment even though conducted on
less than probable cause.99
More recently, a majority of the Court upheld the detention
without probable cause of persons found at the scene of the execution of a search warrant. 10 0 The Court reasoned that only a limited
interest in personal security was involved, that sufficient law enforcement interests were present, and that the issuance of a search
warrant provided sufficient articulable suspicion to support the detention. The majority thus held that the officer's actions met the
standard of reasonableness embodied in the fourth amendment. 10 1
96. Id. at 9.
97. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
98. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
99. Id. at 558-60. See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (invalidating random vehicle stops for license and registration checks, but intimating the validity of fixed
checkpoints where all vehicles are stopped); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
(upholding an officer's right to order arbitrarily a motorist stopped for a traffic violation out
of the vehicle); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (holding probable
cause, or even reasonable suspicion, unnecessary for checkpoint stops).
100. Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981).
101. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stewart
argued, inter alia, that the intrusion in question was not necessarily limited, since "a detention 'while a proper search is being conducted' can mean a detention of several hours." Id.
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The Supreme Court thus has subsumed the CamaralTerry
reasonableness analysis under its second category of fourth amendment interests in which the expectations of privacy concerned are
of reduced significance.102 With privacy interests diminished, they
easily are outweighed by the law enforcement interests in question;
the amount of fourth amendment protection in this category is
then dependent upon how the Court strikes the reasonableness
balance. Although application of the reasonableness clause to this
classification generally has resulted in probable cause-but not
warrants-being required, the Supreme Court occasionally has
viewed the privacy interests at issue to be of such reduced importance in comparison to law enforcement needs that it has justified
dispensing with the necessity of probable cause as a prerequisite
for particular police conduct.
The third and final classification under the Supreme Court's
current vision of the fourth amendment comprises those cases in
which the Court has found an absence of any privacy expectation
whatsoever. This category is the most problematic of the three,
since the conclusion that no legitimate expectation of privacy exists at all excludes the particular interest or activity from fourth
amendment protection and frees the police practice concerned
from either constitutional or judicial control. Because the fourth
amendment has been geared to the protection of privacy interests,
if the Court is able to conclude that no privacy expectation exists,
the fourth amendment affords no protection against the activities
of the police regardless of their general contravention of fourth
amendment principles. This conclusion in essence means that the
commands of the fourth amendment-both the warrant and reasonableness clauses-do not apply in such cases. In other words,
the police simply are not required to justify their actions by either
at 2598 (footnote omitted). The dissenters thus felt that the majority's position was inconsistent with Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), which prohibited custodial detention unless probable cause is shown.
102. See, for example, Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (1981), upholding a warrantless administrative search under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-164, §§ 102(a), 102(b), 201, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-802, 811,
813(a) (Supp. 11 1979)). The Court concluded that the expectation of privacy in commercial
property is significantly different from that accorded the home and that certain regulatory
schemes authorizing warrantless inspections can adequately protect commercial privacy interests. The search was thus found reasonable under the fourth amendment. In United
States v. Cortez, 101 S. Ct. 690 (1981), the Court held a border patrol stop of a vehicle based
on particularized suspicion to be reasonable, partly on the ground that only a limited privacy intrusion was involved. See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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probable cause or reasonable suspicion, since, according to the Supreme Court, the object of the fourth amendment-privacy-is not
implicated in these cases.
This branch of the new expectation of privacy triad was the
first to develop after Katz firmly shifted the focus of search and
seizure law to privacy interests. Although prior to Katz the Court
had upheld the use of secret agents on the grounds of assumption
of the risk and the sacrifice of privacy when one freely communicates with a police agent, 103 as well as on the ground of the inherent reliability of a simultaneous electronic recording,"" it also upheld this practice because of the absence of either a trespass or an
unlawful invasion of a constitutionally protected area.105 As a result of this traditional reliance on the trespass rationale, when the
Court in Katz changed the focus of the fourth amendment from
property to privacy it left the continued permissibility of law enforcement use of wired informants in doubt. As a consequence, the
Court in United States v. White1 0° was forced to reconsider the
issue under the new privacy formula. White dealt with the admissibility of testimony of federal agents who had overheard conversations between the defendant and a government informant carrying
a concealed radio transmitter. Justice White's plurality opinion addressed the question squarely, discounting the former trespass rationale and stressing that an individual enjoys no "constitutionally
justifiable" privacy expectation that his associates will not be police informants or will not otherwise turn to the police. He then
stated that neither the risk assumed nor the relative sense of security is substantially different when the police informant is also
wired for sound.10 7 Therefore, the Court concluded, the fourth
amendment provides no protection against electronically equipped
police agents because of the absence of a legitimate privacy expec103. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747 (1952).
104. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963).
105. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952). See also Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olinstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
106. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
107. Id. at 751. Justice White's plurality opinion also stressed the accuracy and reliability of an electronic recording in comparison to the unaided memory of a police agent. Id.
at 753.
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tation that one's associates will not be recording conversations for
the police.
Since establishing the concept of a complete absence of any
privacy expectation, the Supreme Court has decided seven cases in
which it has found no fourth amendment interests to be implicated. Thus, a majority of the Court found no privacy interest involved either in the summons of business records from a taxpayer's
' or in the subpoenaing of bank records from a
accountant 08
deposi1
09
tor's bank. Likewise, the Court found no expectation of privacy
in voice exemplars'10 or handwriting samples."" More recently, the
Court refused to recognize any privacy interest in phone numbers
dialed from a particular telephone,11 2 in an automobile from the
standpoint of a passenger," 3s or in the purse of a companion, even
though the defendant owned the items seized therefrom.1 1 4 These
cases and the Supreme Court's new fourth amendment jurisprudence make it clear that privacy interests will be scrutinized carefully and construed narrowly. Most significantly, they indicate that
when no privacy expectation is found, the fourth amendment will
provide no control over police investigatory practices. Whether it is
articulated outright 15 or is justified by the conclusion that no
search has taken place since no privacy interest exists,' 16 the result
is the same: the fourth amendment is unavailable to regulate law
enforcement activity in these cases.

The Court's new privacy hierarchy thus stretches from full
fourth amendment warrant protection to an absolute void of
fourth amendment regulation. It is precisely this elasticity that
makes the approach troublesome. Regardless of whether the privacy triad is the result of haphazard lawmaking, careful efforts to
balance individual and law enforcement interests, or preconceived
catering to the police side of the scale, the Court's scheme has cre108. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
109. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
110. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
111. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
112. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
113. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
114. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
115. The cases of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98 (1980), in which the Court held that the police searches in question did not violate
any rights of the petitioners, are examples of this straightforwardness.
116. Compare Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) and Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). The Court in Smith reasoned
that since no legitimate expectation of privacy existed in a pen register device that recorded
numbers dialed from a particular telephone, no "search" had occurred.
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ated substantial jurisprudential and pragmatic problems. The approach is at best confusing and at worst exhibits infidelity to the
privacy notions expressed in Katz. To the extent that some individual expectations of privacy are found to be constitutionally illegitimate and police practices that infringe upon them go unrestrained, the fourth amendment is eviscerated. In addition, the
lack of clarity and predictability inherent in the inquiry of which
privacy expectations are constitutionally legitimate leaves the police and the courts without standards to guide their conduct and
decisions; this uncertainty, in turn, further exacerbates the diminished protection available to complainants under the Supreme
Court's view of fourth amendment privacy.
The Supreme Court's new privacy formulation appears to be
to an
an effort to accommodate local law enforcement and amounts
117
abdication to state judges on fourth amendment issues. It must
be hoped that state courts either will take a broad view of privacy
under the fourth amendment or will apply their own constitutional
search and seizure provisions to protect privacy interests. In the
absence of these developments, it might be better to do without
the federal exclusionary remedy provided in Mapp v. Ohio than to
witness the continuing evisceration of substantive fourth amendment protection in an effort to circumvent application of the exclusionary rule.
Ill.

INADEQUACIES OF THE COURT'S PRIVACY MODEL

A.

Infidelity to Katz

In 1967 the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren
decided Katz v. United States with the intent of expanding the
scope of fourth amendment protection. The thrust of the opinion
and its privacy language were designed to force law enforcement
agencies to comply with fourth amendment requirements in cases
in which they formerly would have been unconstrained by the
Constitution. The shift in emphasis from "places" to "people" was
simply a realization that fourth amendment interests extend beyond constitutionally protected areas. Thus, the Court in Katz
held that anytime police activity violates a privacy interest, it is
117. As long as the states provide an opportunity for full and fair determination of
fourth amendment claims, there is no longer a right to federal habeas corpus. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Regardless of whether this full and fair opportunity includes a
state appeal, state convictions now are insulated from federal court reversal on fourth
amendment grounds. See note 275 infra and accompanying text.
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governed by the fourth amendment. This holding clearly was intended to broaden judicial control over police practices to all cases
in which a reasonable privacy expectation is implicated.
Unfortunately, the Court in Katz did not-and of course could
not-explicate the full range of interests and expectations to be
protected. The fluidity and amorphous nature of the privacy model
make it impossible to delineate its contours and parameters prospectively. This indeterminancy allows the concept to be molded
and manipulated in individual cases to accommodate a particular
policy perspective. Consequently, the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Warren Burger has utilized the privacy formula to restrict
rather than expand fourth amendment supervision of police practices. Moreover, in addition to taking a narrow view of privacy interests, the Court has limited fourth amendment protection of
property interests as well. 118
1.

Privacy Interests

The Court struck the first note of disharmony with Katz in
United States v. White'" when it utilized the privacy notion in a
negative fashion to deny fourth amendment protection, holding
that there was no justifiable expectation of privacy in voluntary
conversations. The Court's rationale in White was that when one
voluntarily converses with another party, he or she assumes the
risk that the other party will divulge the information to the government. The Court also reasoned that the risk assumed is not appreciably greater when the informant simultaneously transmits or
records the defendant's comments. 20 From a true privacy perspective, this argument is inapposite for two reasons. First, while an
individual who speaks to another person cannot be assured that his
remarks will remain absolutely confidential, it is unlikely that he
appreciates the risk of their disclosure to the government, or that
he assumes this risk has been multiplied by the government's encouragement of his associates to divulge their information to public
officials. This proposition unreasonably extends beyond the risks
and realities of oral communication in a free society. Second, even
assuming that the use of secret agents and informants who report
back and testify is not an unfair crime detection practice, the issue
118.
intend to
79 infra.
119.
120.

In applying the fourth amendment to privacy interests in Katz, the Court did not
withdraw its protection from property interests. See text accompanying notes 170401 U.S. 745 (1971).
Id. at 751-53.
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is altered considerably from a privacy perspective when a participant who is cooperating with the police electronically transmits or
records his conversations with the defendant. As Justice Brennan
pointed out in his dissent in Lopez v. United States,
[T]here is a qualitative difference between electronic surveillance, whether
the agents conceal the devices on their persons or in walls or under beds, and
conventional police stratagems such as eavesdropping and disguise. The

latter do not so seriously intrude upon the right of privacy ....

But as soon

as electronic surveillance comes into play, the risk changes crucially. There is
no security from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating the risk,
and so not even a residuum of true privacy....
Electronic aids add a wholly new dimension to eavesdroping. They
...
make it more penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a
free society.121

Four years after Lopez, a majority of the Court in Katz recognized the evils of electronic surveillance and cast doubt on the uncontrolled use of electronically equipped agents.1 22 The membership of the Court soon changed, however, and in White four
justices (plus Justice Black, who concurred for the reasons expressed in his dissent in Katz) ruled that the fourth amendment
did not apply to participant monitoring because privacy is compromised when one voluntarily carries on a conversation. In a strong
dissent, Justice Harlan delineated the threats to privacy and communication that electronic monitoring creates. He emphasized that
an additional intrusion upon a person's privacy occurs when a conversation, which is either overheard by others unfamiliar with the
situation or later analyzed from a cold, formal recording, is fully
disclosed without the benefit of human interpretation and editing. 2 He also stressed that the plurality's position had the potential to inhibit communication and destroy the spontaneity of exchange in daily life, since one could no longer count on either the
obscurity 2of his remarks or the security in speaking to a limited
1
audience. 4
It is surprising that the Court did not take a different view of
electronically equipped agents. From the standpoint of a privacy
analysis, the facts in United States v. White are virtually
equivalent to those in Katz. It is doubtful that the defendant in
Katz would have felt his privacy any less invaded if his call had
been monitored and disclosed by the party with whom he was com121.
122.
123.
124.

373 U.S. 427, 465-66 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See notes 103-07 supra and accompanying text.
401 U.S. at 790 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 787-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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municating, rather than electronically intercepted by the government. Viewed from Katz' perspective, the infringement on his privacy is the same. It is strange, then, that the Supreme Court would
conclude that the fourth amendment's warrant requirement applies in one case but not in the other. After all-and this point
deserves emphasis-the Court in White was not asked to outlaw
participant monitoring absolutely as a police detection practice; it
simply was asked to impose judicial supervision over these methods by requiring compliance with fourth amendment standards.
A similar sacrifice of privacy expectations has been found in
12 5
other selective disclosure situations. In United States v. Miller,
for example, the Court held that the petitioner could not challenge
a subpeona duces tecum that had been issued for his bank records,
which were kept pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.126 The
majority reasoned that the situation was akin to the one in White
in the sense that by voluntarily conveying the information contained in the financial documents to the bank and its employees,
petitioner had forfeited his expectation of privacy and had assumed the risk that the information would be conveyed to the government.1 2 7 The majority's conclusion is perplexing when it is considered that an individual discloses financial information to a bank
with the reasonable expectation that the information will not be
released except to the bank's immediate employees. As a unanimous California Supreme Court stated in reaching a conclusion
contrary to the one in Miller,
It cannot be gainsaid that the customer of a bank expects that the documents, such as checks, which he transmits to the bank in the course of his
business operations, will remain private, and that such an expectation is reasonable ....

Representatives of several banks testified at the suppression

hearing that information in their possession regarding a customer's account is

deemed by them to be confidential.

.. A bank customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion
by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the
bank only for internal banking purposes. Thus, we hold petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the bank would maintain the confidentiality of those
125. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).

126. Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 101, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d)
(1976)).
127. 425 U.S. at 442-43. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). In

Couch the Supreme Court held in part that petitioner had no legitimate expectation of privacy in business records, which he voluntarily gave to an accountant, since much of the
information had to be disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service in petitioner's income tax
return. The Court thus concluded that the fourth or fifth amendments would not bar
production.
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papers which originated with him in check form and of the bank statements
into which a record of those same checks had been transformed pursuant to

internal bank practice.l"s

In fact, it cannot be said that financial disclosures to a bank are
truly voluntary, since it is a virtual necessity to maintain a bank
account in order to participate economically in contemporary society. Indeed, it would seem that the only sensible conclusion to be
drawn in these cases is that a bank customer should enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in the confidential financial information that he discloses to his bank. Thus, the Court's holding in
Miller can only be indicative of an attempt to emasculate the Katz
privacy formula in the interest129of lessening judicial supervision
over law enforcement activities.

Another example of the Court's attitude toward fourth amendment privacy expectations in the area of selective disclosures is
Smith v. Maryland.1 0 In Smith a five-to-three majority held that
the fourth amendment did not apply to a pen register, which is a
device that records the numbers dialed from a particular telephone. The Court concluded that petitioner in all probability had
no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed,
and that in any event, such an expectation would not be a legitimate one. While the majority's statements about what petitioner's
subjective expectations might have been are questionable, the real
import of the case lies in its reliance on Miller and the participant
monitoring cases for the conclusion that since Smith had voluntarily conveyed the numerical information to the telephone company, he assumed the risk that the company would disclose the
numbers he dialed to the government.131
Actually, the holding in Smith is even more misguided than
the decision in Miller because the use of the telephone is even less
voluntary than the use of bank services. In our transient and scattered society, the telephone is virtually a communications necessity. Although it is true that telephone usage itself is in some sense
voluntary, the conclusion that a person assumes the risk of the
128. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243, 529 P.2d 590, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr.
166, 169 (1974) (applying CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13, which is virtually identical to the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution).
129. In response to Miller, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (Supp. I1 1979), which requires that the bank customer be
notified of any federal subpoena or summons for financial records, and generally provides
for the right to challenge the subpoena or summons prior to its execution.
130. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
131. Id. at 743-45.
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numbers he dials being disclosed ignores both subjective and objective notions of privacy. It is not generally believed, nor is it true
in fact, 3 2 that telephone companies record local calls,""3 and irrespective of mechanical capacity and practice, telephone patrons
undoubtedly would be shocked to learn that records of their calls
either were available for third parties or were being distributed
outside the telephone system. Beyond the necessary internal business practices of the telephone company, people expect their use of
the telephone to be absolutely private, and it is reasonable for
them to believe that the numbers dialed from private telephones
are as free from uncontrolled government seizure as are their telephone conversations. It would be unreasonable to assume that the
defendant in Katz would have had less of an expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed from his own private telephone than
he did in the content of a conversation in a public telephone booth.
Thus, the exclusion of the fourth amendment probable cause and
warrant requirements from the former type of seizure cannot be
supported by a distinction drawn on privacy grounds. The Court's
reliance on the privacy formula in Smith, therefore, was both misleading and misplaced.
The selective disclosure cases are a prime example of the Supreme Court's use of the privacy concept, which originally was
designed to expand the scope of fourth amendment protection, to
draw unrealistic distinctions in favor of law enforcement. Extrapolating a complete forfeiture of privacy from a minor voluntary
disclosure for a specific, limited purpose is indicative of a complete
lack of appreciation for the notion of relativity. Privacy is not an
all or nothing phenomenon; rather, it is a relative concept centering around the right to limit the access of others to our personal
and private lives.134 The foundation for such a privacy concept
rests in a person's ability to circumscribe the disclosure of information about himself. Of necessity, privacy must be viewed and
defined at least in part as the control over acquaintanceships and
disclosures, 3 5 for absolute privacy in modern society is simply un132.
133.

See generally id. at 745.
The calls made by the petitioner in Smith v. Maryland were local calls. Id. at

745.
134. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980). The author
notes that pure privacy, in the sense of absolute inaccessibility, is unattainable in any

society.
135. Id. at 426-27. See also Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, NOMOS XIII, PRIVACY 169
(R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971) (Yearbook of the American Society for Political and
Legal Philosophy).
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attainable unless one lives the life of a recluse.
In a related vein, Professor Weinreb presents a rather effective
example to illustrate this concept of the relativity of privacy. He
suggests that when people are moving about in public-on the
streets, in parks, or wherever-they retain an element of privacy in
the form of anonymity, which he describes as the "privacy of presence."136 Although people generally expose themselves voluntarily
to personal observation, their assumption is that this observation
is both ephemeral and unrecorded, and not subject to the wholesale televised or videotaped monitoring of their every action and
acquaintance. 13 7 Unquestionably, this kind of monitoring of people's daily lives would alter drastically the nature of our society.""
Whether walking in public, using the telephone, or disclosing
personal information to accountants, bankers, doctors, or lawyers,
people do not intend to sacrifice entirely the sphere of privacy that
surrounds their daily affairs. They merely make a choice, forced by
the necessities of contemporary life, to reveal private information
about themselves selectively for a narrow and limited purpose.13 '
Indeed, in a different context, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that limited disclosure does not destroy privacy interests. In
136. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L. Rav. 47, 52
(1974). Weinreb poses the hypothetical, see id. at 81-82, of monitoring on television every
person and occurrence in New York City's Central Park--"put[ting] the whole park 'on
television' from dusk to dawn." He observes that
[t]he park might [then] be abandoned not only by the muggers, but also by lovers
holding hands in secret or just in private, friends wanting to talk intimately with one
another, an artist wanting to paint or think to himself, people doing all sorts of innocent things they would not do on television.
Id. at 82. If this monitoring were extended to other public places, there is no question that
people would suffer an equivalent loss of privacy while in public.
The cases which hold that electronic tracking invades legitimate privacy expectations
are an illustration of Professor Weinreb's point. See United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1975), affd en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); United States v.
Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976).
137. Weinreb, supra note 136, at 81-82.
138. Id. at 82-83. The videotapings in the Abscam cases are examples of the kinds of
intrusions that would lead us to be a more circumspect and secretive society. Although this
type of electronic and video monitoring of private conversations and transactions generally
is prohibited when no one involved consents, televised intrusions upon our public activities
might be permissible if the notion of the relativity of privacy were not recognized.
139. Recognition of the relativity of privacy concept also calls into question those
cases that validate a third party's consent to be searched. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98 (1980) (holding that petitioner had no privacy interest in items he placed in
companion's purse); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (holding that petitioner
had no privacy interest in items found in shared living quarters).
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Whalen v. Roe1 40 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state
statute that required records to be kept of the identity of persons
for whom certain lawful but dangerous drugs were prescribed. The
Court rejected the invasion of privacy claim in part because the
statute limited disclosure of the information to the state health
agency's employees.14 1 If it were in fact true that a limited disclosure results in a complete forfeiture of any expectation of privacy,
it would seem to follow that the Court in Whalen would have been
led to declare the statute unconstitutional on the ground that it
required the defendant to forfeit a privacy right.
To hold in the fourth amendment context that a narrow, selective disclosure completely destroys any legitimate expectation of
privacy is completely incompatible with the privacy concept. Such
a holding-whether it is viewed commonsensically or constitutionally-can only be analyzed as part of an adjudicative model that
favors police practices and simultaneously distorts the notion of
privacy.142 This is unfortunate, since it makes the scope of constitutional privacy narrower than that reasonably available in everyday life. Fourth amendment privacy interests should be at least
coextensive with the privacy society has been able to achieve or
retain for itself without the aid of the courts. The language Justice
Black used in his Katz dissent about the Court's "clever word juggling" to get beyond the narrow trespass rationale14 has never
been more apropos. He would be content, perhaps, to learn that
the words are now being juggled back.
It would be impossible to complete a discussion of the Supreme Court's current infidelity to the Katz privacy standard without some mention of the Court's automobile cases. The Court has
concluded in a series of cases14 4 that the driver of an automobile
140. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
141. Id. at 602.
142. Although the privacy concept may have a rather broad constitutional base, see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the fourth
amendment is its source in the search and seizure context. See Katz v. United States, 389

U.S. 347 (1967).
143. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
144. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68
(1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974);

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970);
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); cf.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1979) (holding that police must obtain a warrant
before searching luggage taken from an automobile that was properly stopped and
searched).
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has only a diminished expectation of privacy in his vehicle, and
that, consequently, if the police have probable cause they can
search it without a warrant. This reduction in privacy expectations
is justified on the grounds that automobiles constantly are exposed
to the public and frequently are subject to extensive official regulation and monitoring. 1 45 While this rationale might justify stopping
a vehicle without a warrant-or on less than probable cause-and
cursorily surveying that part of the interior which is within the officer's view, it hardly justifies a thorough, warrantless search of the
glove compartment and trunk. It is axiomatic that the trunk of a
vehicle serves the same function as a briefcase, suitcase, or footlocker-to transport personal items from one place to another. The
Court's rationale in the automobile cases, therefore, conflicts with
its own analysis in United States v. Chadwick148 and Arkansas v.
Sanders,1 4 7 cases in which a majority held that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in a footlocker and a suitcase, respectively.
In Sanders the police found the suitcase in a vehicle's trunk; nevertheless, the Court found the privacy interest intact. One must
contemplate carefully the difference between a traveller's trunk, a
within a trunk" to find a workable
motorist's trunk, and a "trunk
1 48
distinction among them.
The concept of a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile has not altered the result in fourth amendment adjudication concerning owner-drivers; it has simply moved the focus from
one questionable analysis-mobility-to another-diminished
privacy. 4 e The Supreme Court has virtually eliminated fourth
amendment protection of passengers, however, by concluding in
Rakas v. Illinois'5 0 that they have no expectation of privacy in the
vehicles in which they are riding. This holding is considerably
more problematic than the diminished privacy notion because it
means, somewhat surprisingly, that the police are practically un145. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
146. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
147. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
148. Some courts have rejected the view that a motorist's expectation of privacy in his
automobile trunk is diminished. These courts consequently have required a warrant as a
prerequisite to a search. See Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 547 P.2d 417, 128
Cal. Rptr. 641 (1976); Commonwealth v. Long, 489 Pa. 369, 414 A.2d 113 (1980) (relying on
Chadwick). In a similar vein, the cases refusing to recognize police authority to conduct
inventory searches following the impoundment of a vehicle are also noteworthy. See State v.
Rome, 354 So. 2d 504 (La. 1978); State v. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. 1977); State v.
Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
149. See note 84 supra.
150. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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controlled by fourth amendment requirements when dealing with
passengers. Presumably, then, the police now can stop and search a
vehicle without probable cause at will, and passengers cannot complain because their fourth amendment rights have not been
invaded.
The decision in Rakas is unsatisfactory for two major reasons.
First, the Rakas majority of five Justices neither convincingly distinguishes previous cases in the area nor adequately explains why a
person lawfully present in a vehicle should not be able to rely on
the established standard of privacy and security in the place
searched. 151 Speaking for the Court, Justice Rehnquist recognized
that privacy interests are not restricted to one's own home and
that the sphere of privacy moves with the person. 152 Thus, it would
seem to follow that when an owner invites someone to share the
benefits of his private property, the invitee should enjoy any concomitant privacy expectation that the property will be free from
unwarranted official intrusion. Indeed, it is unclear why a legitimate presence on private property15" is not equivalent to a legitimate expectation of privacy.'" Nevertheless, the majority in Rakas
rejected outright the "legitimately on the premises" standard of
Jones v. United States. 55 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist suggested
that regardless of the Court's repudiation of this standard from
Jones, that case was factually distinguishable from Rakas on a privacy basis, since Jones had permission and the key to use his
friend's apartment, kept possessions there, and was present at the
151. Rakas argued that his fourth amendment rights had been implicated because his
occupancy of the vehicle satisfied the "legitimately on the premises" standard for fourth
amendment standing that was established in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the approach used in Jones for an inquiry based on
whether petitioner had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. 439 U.S. at
140-43.
152. 439 U.S. at 142. See also Weinreb, supra note 136.
153. See notes 67-71 & 151 supra and accompanying text.
154. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, in an attempt to illustrate the difference
between presence and privacy, uses two extreme examples: (1) a visitor in the kitchen of a
home when the basement is searched; and (2) a visitor who enters a home immediately
before and leaves immediately after a search. He concludes that in neither case would the
visitor have a legitimate expectation of privacy warranting constitutional protection. 439
U.S. at 142. If in both cases, however, the visitor on the private property has a sufficient
interest in articles located in the place searched, and the articles are sought to be introduced
against him as evidence of guilt, then it would seem that he has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the place where the articles were left, regardless of whether the visitor was on the
premises during the search. See notes 191-214 infra and accompanying text.
155. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See notes 67-71 & 151 supra and accompanying text.
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time of the search. 156 The only real factual distinction between
Jones and Rakas, however, is that the defendant in Jones had a
key; yet, a key was irrelevant to the defendant in Rakas because
was present and voluntarily allowed him to enter the
the owner
57
vehicle.

1

The Court in Rakas also failed to distinguish convincingly the
communicative privacy of a phone booth, which was protected in
Katz, from the physical privacy of an automobile. "" Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion joined by the Chief Justice, suggested
that an important factor in determining fourth amendment protection is whether a person takes normal precautions to protect his
privacy. To support this proposition, the Justice cited Chadwick,
in which the Court held that the petitioner had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a locked footlocker.L59 Again, it is difficult to
grasp the difference between the precautionary measures taken
with a locked footlocker and those taken with a locked glove compartment in an automobile. In fact, it seems completely illogical to
conclude that a passenger in an automobile has no expectation of
privacy in the articles he places in the vehicle's trunk. 160
The second major defect in the Court's view of the interests of
a passenger in an automobile is that it conflicts with the Court's
own deterrence justification for the exclusionary rule. Law enforcement officers now know that as long as it is a passenger who is
prosecuted, they can stop a vehicle without probable cause, search
it, and be entirely unsanctioned by the exclusionary rule. The rule
thus loses its deterrent effect upon this type of lawless police behavior. This is not to say, however, that Rakas grants the police a
carte blanche against passengers in vehicles, since a passenger does
retain some personal privacy interests. He enjoys an expectation of
privacy in his person, for example, as well as in items such as a
suitcase or briefcase that he uses to carry his personal ef156.
157.

439 U.S. at 149 (1978).
See id. at 165 (White, J., dissenting).

158. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Katz on the ground that Katz entered the telephone booth, shut the door behind him, and paid the toll. Id. at 149.
159. Id. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring); see notes 146-47 supra and accompanying
text. Note also the majority's reliance on this factor in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
105 (1980).
160. See 439 U.S. at 148 (1978). Justice Powell's statement that "the shared experience of us all bears witness" that passengers have no reasonable expectation that a car in
which they had been riding will not be searched, id. at 155, is equally implausible and assumes too much.

1981]

FOURTH AMENDMENT

1321

fects-regardless of where they might be located in the vehicle." 1
In addition, a stop of the vehicle in which he is riding at least must
be justified under the reasonableness standard embodied in Terry
v. Ohio;''2 otherwise, evidence discovered in a subsequent search of
the vehicle would be the fruit of his illegal detention. Notwithstanding these protections, however, when an automobile is legally
stopped-for example, for a traffic infraction-under Rakas the
police are free to search the car thoroughly without complying with
constitutional requirements, and the passenger cannot complain.
This lack of constraint presents a framework in which there may
be nothing to lose and something to gain by the illegal search of a
car that carries more than one occupant. If officers lack probable
cause, theoretically under the fourth amendment they cannot conduct a legal search; however, if there are persons in the car other
than the driver-owner, the legality of the search is irrelevant because, according to Rakas, the passengers have no expectation of
privacy and thus cannot invoke the fourth amendment. 6 3
2.

Property Interests

This Article has emphasized that the Supreme Court's recent
decisions applying the Katz privacy formula appear to be somewhat illogical and unrealistic, in addition to being a clear aid to law
enforcement agencies. Not surprisingly, however, privacy interests
have not been the only victim of the Court's current infidelity to
Katz, since property interests also have suffered. Moreover, in a
process similar to the one witnessed in the privacy cases, the erosion of protection for property interests has resulted in a constric161. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 422 U.S.
753 (1979). But see New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). The Court in Belton held in
the 1980-81 term that following a custodial arrest of the occupants of a vehicle, the vehicle's
entire passenger compartment-including any open or closed containers found
therein-could be searched without a warrant incident to the arrest. The majority relied on
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), to conclude that the lawful custodial arrest justified the invasion of any privacy interests. This expansion of the Chimel search-incident-toarrest doctrine dealing with automobiles provides a fairly clear picture of the Court's current attitude toward vehicular searches.
162. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See notes 34-41 supra and accompanying text. See also Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). If at least a reasonable
suspicion were not necessary to "stop" a passenger, the Court's decision in Rakas would
directly conflict with Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), in which the Court held arbitrary vehicular stops for license and registration checks to be unconstitutional.
163. For an example of the government affirmatively counseling its agents that the
fourth amendment standing limitation permits them to conduct illegal searches and seizures
to gain evidence against third parties, see United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 132-33
(N.D. Ohio 1977), aff'd per curiam, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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tion of prior fourth amendment doctrine.
The fourth amendment, of course, speaks of "papers and effects" in addition to "persons" and "houses." 1 The United States
Supreme Court in 1951 recognized the clear import of this language in United States v. Jeffers

5

when it held that a property

interest in narcotics that had been seized was sufficient to establish
standing to challenge the police search in question.16 In addition,
other cases decided prior to Katz relied on property interests to
confer standing to raise fourth amendment claims. The "automatic
standing" notion adopted in Jones v. United States,1 67 for example, was motivated by an appreciation of the dilemma that the
same "possession both convicts and confers standing."168 To avoid
placing the defendant in the unenviable position of having to admit possession of narcotics to establish standing and then be faced
with the introduction of the same testimony against him at a trial
on the merits, the Court in Jones held that a person charged with
a possessory offense has automatic standing to challenge the relevant search and seizure. 69
The decision in Katz v. United States,17 0 which relies on privacy expectations rather than property interests, was not intended
to alter completely the fourth amendment focus. Although Katz
admittedly can be read either as a displacement of the property
analysis by one based on privacy or as merely an adjunct to the
protection of property interests, Justice Stewart's remark to the
164.
165.
166.
Salvucci,

See note 2 supra.
342 U.S. 48 (1951).
Although Justice Rehnquist's majority opinions in Rakas and United States v.
448 U.S. 83 (1980), attempt to explain the defendant's standing in Jeffers on the

ground that he claimed a "possessory interest in both the premises searched and the property seized," id. at 91 n.5, the crux of the Jeffers decision clearly is its emphasis on the
defendant's property interest in the narcotics. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54
(1951).
167. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
168. Id. at 263.
169. In addition to the conflict between the fourth and fifth amendments, the Court
recognized that requiring a defendant to establish standing in a possessory offense case allowed the government to take advantage of contradictory positions-claiming an absence of
possession in the suppression hearing while arguing sufficient possession to establish guilt at
trial. Id. The Supreme Court recently held, in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)
(overruling Jones), that the fourth and fifth amendments dilemma had been eliminated by
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), a case in which the Court held testimony
given in a suppression hearing to establish standing inadmissible at trial. The Court also
stated in Salvucci that the contradictory positions problem had been eliminated by Rakas,
which placed the fourth amendment focus clearly and exclusively on privacy. See 448 U.S.
at 90; text accompanying notes 180-85 infra.
170. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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effect that the "[fourth] [a]mendment protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion but its protections
'1 7 1
go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all,"

seems to indicate that the Court intended the latter. Katz thus can
be seen as part of an effort both to expand the fourth amendment
beyond the confines of trespass law'7 2 and to provide protection for

conversational privacy when there might be no real or personal
property interest involved. Simply put, Katz represents the Supreme Court's response to the new technological intrusiveness of
an advanced society. Indeed, the Court made clear that it did not
intend to disavow property interests in subsequent cases such as
Alderman v. United States,17 3 in which it held that a homeowner

had standing to challenge the admissibility of electronically seized
conversations occurring on his premises regardless of whether he
was present or a party to these conversations. In spite of Justice
Harlan's strong dissent arguing that an absent homeowner who has
no property interest in the conversations seized can have no privacy interest at all in such cases, the majority concluded that the
homeowner nevertheless may object because the fourth amendment expressly protects the house itself.174
Other Supreme Court 75 and lower court decisions17 since
Katz likewise have recognized that a defendant could raise a
fourth amendment challenge by claiming a possessory interest in
the items seized. It is not surprising, then, that Justice Rehnquist
continually suggested in Rakas that the situation would have been
different if Rakas had claimed a property interest in the rifle or
shells seized from the vehicle. 7 7 In fact, after the Rakas decision,
171. Id. at 350. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 385; Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note
14, at 451; Note, A Reconsiderationof the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 ICH. L.

Rav. 154, 172-82 (1977).
172.
173.

See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
394 U.S. 165 (1969).

174. Id. at 176-77.
175. In Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), for example, the Court denied
the petitioners standing because they did not "allege any legitimate interest of any kind in
the premises searched or the merchandiseseized." Id. at 229 (emphasis added). In Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Court stated that "[r]espondent concedes that the suitcase was in his property...

and so there is no question of his standing to challenge the

search." Id. at 761 n.8.
176.

See J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AccusED: PRETRIAL RIGHTS

§

77

(1972 & Supp. 1980) (collecting cases).
177. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129, 130, 142 n.11, 144 n.12, 148 (1978). Justice
Rehnquist's strongest statement about property interests is made when he says,
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or
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it seemed that the simple solution for a defendant was to claim an
interest in the property seized and rely on Simmons v. United
Statesl"' for the assurance that this testimony could not be introduced later by the prosecution at trial.179
The Supreme Court, as well, must have recognized this simple
solution because in two cases handed down during the final week
of the 1979-80 term a majority held, for the first time, that a possessory interest in the items seized in an illegal search does not
necessarily establish a violation of a fourth amendment interest.
Thus, in United States v. Salvucci' 80 the Court overruled the automatic standing rule of Jones. The majority first concluded that
Simmons had eliminated the fourth and fifth amendment dilemma
by its holding that testimony given in a suppression hearing to establish standing is not admissible at trial. 81 In examining the
other rationale underlying automatic standing-prosecutorial contradiction-Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, indicated that Rakas had solved this problem when it placed the
fourth amendment focus clearly and exclusively on privacy. 82 He
then stated that the underlying assumption in Jones that a possessory interest in property seized is sufficient to establish fourth
amendment standing had been discredited. For this proposition
to the understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main
rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others... and one who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.
Id. at 144 n.12.
178. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). See note 169 supra.
179. Neither petitioner in Rakas asserted an interest in the rifle or shells seized from
the automobile. Why they did not rely on Simmons is unclear. Possibly the defendants'
attorney was unaware that testimony given to establish standing was not admissible at trial.
The negative psychological impact of an admission of ownership also may have been a factor. The most likely reason, however, is that testimony offered in a suppression hearing to
establish standing is admissible under Illinois law for impeachment at trial if the defendant
takes the stand. See People v. Sturgis, 58 IlM. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 936 (1975).
Interestingly, in a current postconviction proceeding alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel, both petitioners are claiming an interest in the property. King is now claiming an
ownership interest in the car (the driver-owner is King's former wife, and he seems to be
claiming that they brought the car together), and Rakas is asserting ownership of the rifle.
Both are claiming that their counsel was ineffective because of their failure to establish
these claims at the suppression hearing. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAwsAR & L. TRE, THz SuPREME COuRT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1978-1979, at 163-65 (1979).

180. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
181. Id. at 89.
182. Id. at 92-93. See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
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the Justice cited Rawlings v. Kentucky,8" decided the same day,
in which the Court perfunctorily rejected the petitioner's claim
that his asserted ownership of drugs found in a companion's purse
entitled him to challenge the search regardless of whether he had a
privacy interest in the place where they were found."8 Although
Justice Rehnquist concluded that property ownership is a factor to
consider, he stated that the central focus in determining whether
fourth amendment rights have been violated is whether the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place. 28 5 Based on these considerations, a prosecutor thus could argue consistently that the defendant did not have a legitimate privacy interest in the place searched, but nevertheless was in sufficient control of the items seized to indicate evidence of guilt.
Taken together, Salvucci and Rawlings establish the proposition that property interests alone are no longer protected by the
fourth amendment. The Court's cursory adoption of this position
seems cavalier in light of the language of the fourth amendment
and the Court's own precedents. This stance appears to be an effort by the Court to prevent circumvention of its restrictive expectation of privacy formula, a possibility left open in Rakas by Justice Rehnquist's continual reference to the petitioners' failure to
claim an interest in the property seized.
The Court's view of property interests under the fourth
amendment is difficult to accept primarily because the language of
the fourth amendment directly covers these interests. The amendment expressly speaks to "seizures" of "effects;" therefore, this
constitutional provision is activated whenever an individual's property is seized, irrespective of any privacy interest. A disingenuous
argument might be made that an illegal search of A's premises violates no fourth amendment privacy interests of B; therefore, when
B's property is uncovered in such a search, it is in plain view, and,
assuming it is contraband or evidence of a crime, probable cause
then exists to seize it. As pointed out by Justice Marshall's dissent
in Rawlings,1'86 however, this argument was squarely rejected in
United States v. Jeffers,18 7 in which the Court stated,
The Government argues ...that the search did not invade respondent's
183. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).

184. Id. at 105.
185. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980).

186. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 115-16 (1980) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
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privacy and that he, therefore, lacked the necessary standing to suppress the
evidence seized. The significant act, it says, is the seizure of the goods of the
respondent without a warrant. We do not believe the events are so easily isolable. Rather they are bound together by one sole purpose-to locate and seize
the narcotics of respondent. The search and seizure are, therefore, incapable
of being untied. To hold that this search and seizure were lawful as to the
respondent would permit a quibbling distinction to overturn a principle
which was designed to protect a fundamental right.'"

It is difficult to imagine how the seizure of a person's property
can avoid the application of the protected right to be secure in
one's effects.1 19 As the language from the Jeffers opinion indicates,
a search and seizure are not analytically separate events. Justice
Marshall perhaps best summarized this premise in Rawlings when
he said that "[i]f the defendant's property was seized as the result
of an unreasonable search, the seizure cannot be other than
unreasonable." 19 0

Even if property interests are not provided separate fourth
amendment protection, but rather are viewed from the Court's privacy perspective, a persuasive argument can be made that this
nevertheless should not affect the result in fourth amendment
cases. If privacy interests are not static, as the Court recognized in
Rakas,19' it would seem that a person should be entitled to share
the expectation of privacy associated with another's premises when
he voluntarily is permitted to leave personal property there. In
Rakas Justice Rehnquist indicated that a visitor in the kitchen of a
home would not be permitted to object to a search of the basement, and that a visitor who enters immediately before and leaves
immediately after the search of a home would likewise not be in a
position to object. 9 It is not at all clear, however, why this result
would ensue if the government seeks to use the seized evidence
against the visitor. On the contrary, it seems that if a visitor on
private property has personal effects located there, then he also
188. Id. at 52.
189. Justice Rehnquist's comment in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), about
the fourth amendment providing no protection for property inplain view, id. at 106, is
somewhat misleading. Prior to Rakas, Salvucci, and Rawlings, if the defendant's property
were found in another person's home, the defendant could have challenged the entry of the
home. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). As Justice Rehnquist correctly recognizes, even if an officer views property from a public place, prior to Rakas the defendant
still had a fourth amendment interest in the protection of his property, 448 U.S. at 106; it
simply is not violated when the property is plainly visible.
190. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 118 (1980) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan,
J., dissenting).
191. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
192. Id.
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has some expectation of privacy in the place where they were left,
regardless of whether he is personally present. The property interest thus creates a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place
where the property is left, and absent consent by the homeowner,
the person claiming an interest in this property should be protected by the warrant requirement. Justice Rehnquist himself
seemed to recognize this premise in Rakas when he stated in a
footnote that "[t]his isnot to say that such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their
own property were seized during the search." 193
Notwithstanding this recognition of property interests by Justice Rehnquist in Rakas, the Court in Salvucci held that property interests are only one factor to be considered in the privacy
equation. Moreover, another source of confusion emanates from
the Rakas decision. Since the Court in its opinion indicated that
the legitimate presence of the defendant was also a factor to consider in determining privacy expectations, 95 it can be argued that
the result in Rakas would have been different if the petitioners
had claimed an interest in the items seized, for then both the factors of presence and a property interest would have existed. The
problem with this analysis is that both of these factors were present in Rawlings; the defendant was present at the time his female
companion's purse was searched, and he claimed ownership of the
drugs that were seized. The Court, however, concluded that the defendant enjoyed no expectation of privacy in his companion's
196
purse.
It might be argued that the contraband nature of the drugs
seized in Rawlings was the factor that led the Court to reject the
defendants' privacy claim.1 9 7 Even though the Supreme Court suggested in a footnote to its opinion in Brown v. United States9 8
that illegitimate property interests might not be protected 9' and
even though this view would be consistent with the Court's refusal
in Jones to grant standing to someone who was not legitimately on
193. Id. at n.11.
194. See note 177 supra.

195. "We would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate presence on the
premises
Rakas v.
196.
197.
198.
199.

is irrelevant to one's expectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling."
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980).
See Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 14, at 438-44.
411 U.S. 223 (1973).
Id. at 230 n.4.
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the premises, 00 such an interpretation of Rawlings is questionable
for a number of reasons. First, this argument was expressly rejected in United States v. Jeffers.2 1 Second, Warden v. Hayden02
abolished the distinction between contraband, instrumentalities,
and other types of evidence for fourth amendment purposes.20
Third, Justice Rehnquist in Rawlings made absolutely no mention
of the contraband nature of the property seized. Last, and most
important, the Supreme Court recently found that a defendant
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband property. In
Walter v. United States204 the Court held that the FBI's unauthorized viewing of pornographic films violated the owner's constitutionally protected interest in privacy, even though the content of
the films was revealed by descriptive material on their containers.
The recipients of the films had turned them over to the FBI after
they discovered them in a package that erroneously had been delivered to them by an interstate shipper. Although it might be argued that the films in Walter were not pure contraband because
possession of pornography in the privacy of one's own home is not
illegal,205 this distinction is tenuous for the reason that the films in
Walter were clearly contraband in the setting in which they were
discovered. 20 6 Consequently, it is unlikely that the contraband nature of the property seized in Rawlings explains the majority's refusal to find a privacy interest.
If the physical presence of the defendant, coupled with an asserted property interest in the articles seized, does not establish an
expectation of privacy, it is questionable what does. The answer
appears to be that a defendant also must have a property interest
in the place searched,2 07 or at least have the right to exclude
others.20 8 Not only is this further requirement included in the
200. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978).
201. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
202. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
203. Id. at 301-02.
204. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
205. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
206. Petitioners in Walter were indicted on federal obscenity charges for the interstate
transportation of the films, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1462, 1465 (1976). Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 652 (1980).
207. Justice Rehnquist used this language in his majority opinions in Salvucci and
Rakas. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978).
208. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143-44 n.12, 149 (1978).
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Court's articulation of its new privacy formula, but it also provides
an explanation for all of the recent privacy decisions. In Payton v.
New York20 9 and United States v. Chadwick210 the defendants had
an interest in the invaded area-a home and a footlocker. Similarly, in Walter the petitioners had the right to exclude others
from viewing the films without their consent.2 11 The Supreme
Court in the selective disclosure cases, on the other hand, has
viewed the privacy interests involved somewhat more narrowly as
the voluntary relinquishment of the right to exclude others from
the information disclosed.2 12 Although the owner-driver of an automobile has a property interest in the area to be searched, according
to the Court his privacy expectation is diminished, since he does
not have the absolute right to exclude others from his vehicle because of the public nature of automobile travel and state regulation. Furthermore, a passenger in a vehicle presumably has neither
a property interest in the automobile nor a right to exclude others
from it.21 5 Likewise, in Rawlings Justice Rehnquist emphasized
that the defendant had no right to exclude others from his companion's purse.2" Thus, this narrow protected-place right-of-exclusion view of fourth amendment privacy interests apparently explains the Court's prior cases and clearly indicates the current
Court's philosophy and intent to restrict fourth amendment protection to a shrunken core of values within the sphere of privacy
interests.
B. Clarity and Guidance for Police and the Courts
While there may be little doubt about the intent underlying
the Court's fourth amendment cases, the new formula provides little clarity for prospective fourth amendment adjudication. Although the effort to balance individual rights with the necessities
209. 445 U.s. 573 (1980).
210. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
211. The Court points out that the petitioners expected no one but the intended recipient to open the packages. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 (1980). The intended
recipient was also an employee of one of the petitioners' companies, id. at 651 n.1, so there
was no intent at this point to make a disclosure to anyone outside the petitioners' sphere of
privacy. This factor distinguishes the selective disclosure cases. See note 212 infra and accompanying text.

212. See notes 119-43 supra and accompanying text.
213. Justice Powell, concurring in Rakas, suggests that the case might have been different if the petitioners had shown that one of them possessed the keys to the glove compartment (and no rifle had been found under the seat). Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 155
n.4 (1978) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring).
214. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
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of law enforcement under the fourth amendment has never resulted in precision for either the courts or the police, the Supreme
Court's application of its current three-tiered privacy model clearly
has aggravated the problem. One of the first indications of contradiction and uncertainty can be found in the Court's statement in
Rakas that it could think of no Supreme Court case which would
have been decided differently under the new privacy test.2 15 The
focal point of this remark was the Jones case, the result of which
the Rakas Court specifically indicated would not have been altered
by the privacy approach.21 6 This conclusion is difficult to under-

stand under most any reasoning. In Rakas Justice Rehnquist focused on the particular areas of the car searched-the glove compartment and under the seat-and concluded that the petitioners,
who like the defendant in Jones had permission to occupy the general area searched, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
these specific places. In Jones the evidence had been seized from a
bird's nest in an awning outside of a window in the apartment of
one of Jones' friends. It would seem, then, that under the Court's
new privacy formula, Jones would have had no expectation of privacy in this particular area. Moreover, the difference cannot be explained under a right-of-exclusion theory to the effect that Jones
could deny access to the bird's nest by shutting the apartment
door and refusing entry, since the awning could have been
17
2
searched from outside the apartment.

The holding in Rakas that a passenger enjoys no expectation
of privacy in the car in which he is riding is itself inconsistent with
the Court's previous cases. In Schneckloth v. Bustemonte21 8 and

Chambers v. Maroney 19 the petitioners were occupants but not
owners of the vehicles searched. Although in both cases the
searches were upheld-in the former because of consent and in the
latter because the Court found a warrant to be unnecessary-the
decisions clearly imply that if consent or probable cause had been
lacking, the searches would have been invalid. Although the ultimate outcome in those cases was the same as it would be under a
Rakas analysis, the law clearly has been altered, for now neither
215.
216.
217.
was able
257, 259
218.
219.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
Id. at 141, 149.
The window and awning in Jones were close enough to the ground that an officer
to observe Jones placing his hand on the awning. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
(1960).
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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consent nor probable cause is necessary to conduct a search in
which a passenger is involved. Furthermore, there are at least two
cases that struck down searches which apparently now would be
valid. In Dyke v. Taylor Implement ManufacturingCo. 220 only one
of three petitioners owned the vehicle, and in Preston v. United
States221 the sole petitioner was a mere occupant.
Rawlings v. Kentucky most certainly would have been decided
differently if it had come before the Court prior to the decision in
Rakas. Rawlings was legitimately on the premises at the time of
the search and claimed ownership of the drugs that were seized.
Thus, he would have had standing under the authority of both
Jones and Jeffers to challenge the search involved. Rawlings also
would have prevailed on the merits on two grounds. First, the
Court in Rawlings admitted that the initial detention of the petitioner and his companions while a search warrant was being obtained violated the fourth amendment.222 Therefore, the subsequent search of the purse belonging to Rawlings' female
companion, Vanessa Cox, which produced the drugs introduced
against him at trial, as well as the search of Rawlings himself,
which produced the $4,500 in cash, would have been held to be the
fruit of the initial illegal detention. Nevertheless, this was not the
result reached under the Court's privacy analysis, since the illegal
detention and subsequent search of Vanessa Cox was held to violate Rawlings' individual privacy interests. Moreover, Rawlings'
contemporaneous admission that he owned the drugs also would
have been inadmissible prior to the Court's decision in Rakas as a
direct link in the poisonous chain of evidence.2 2 3
220. 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
221. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
222. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980). In Rawlings officers entered the
house of one Marquess with a warrant for his arrest. While attempting to locate Marquess,
the officers smelled marijuana smoke. Two officers left to obtain a search warrant while the
remaining officers detained three of the five occupants found on the premises because they
refused to consent to a body search. After the officers returned with the search warrant,
they gave the Miranda warnings to the occupants and ordered Vanessa Cox, Rawlings' female companion, to empty the contents of her purse. Among the contents were a variety of
drugs that Rawlings had placed in Cox's purse a short time earlier. When petitioner claimed
the drugs he was arrested and searched, and the police found $4,500 in cash on his person.
Id. at 100-01.
223. Again, under the Court's privacy approach, Rawlings' rights were not violated by
Cox's illegal detention and search. That his admission of ownership of the drugs was directly
linked to a violation of Cox's privacy rights is, then, constitutionally irrelevant. Petitioner
did claim, however, that his incriminating admission was the fruit of his own illegal detention. The majority rejected this argument based on an attenuated rationale found in Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106-10 (1980).
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A second basis upon which Rawlings would have prevailed on
the merits of his fourth amendment claim is provided by the
Court's decision in Ybarra v. Illinois.224 In this recent case the

Court held that a search warrant for particular premises does not
authorize a search of persons not named in the warrant who are
found there. Thus, Ybarra clearly would invalidate the search of
2 25
Vanessa Cox.

An examination of these cases suggests that the Court's statement in Rakas about the consistency between its prior cases and
the new privacy perspective was misleading. Furthermore, a good

2 26
many lower court decisions are now also of questionable validity.

The real concern, however, is with the future of fourth amendment
law. At least two things seem clear about where it is headed under
the Supreme Court's three-tiered version of privacy expectations
and interests. First, the test and its application provide the courts
and the police with little guidance with respect to fourth amendment requirements. Second, a majority of the Supreme Court has
set out to restrict the fourth amendment to a narrow core of protected interests, in much the same way that it has restricted freedom of the press under the first amendment.2 27 Unfortunately-or

perhaps fortunately-which interests this core encompasses is less
than clear under the protected-place/right-of-exclusion language.
It would seem, for example, that personal property interests in
some situations deserve protection. If someone is permitted to
leave clothing or other items in the home of a friend or a relative,
that person expects his belongings to be free from unauthorized
official inspection. Rawlings suggests, however, that the Constitution might not protect this interest. If the person who owns the
personal effects is also present on the premises, according to the
Court his privacy interest in these effects is stronger. Nevertheless,
224. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
225. But see Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981). In Summers the Court
upheld the detention of persons found at the scene of the execution of a search warrant.
The Court suggested that the question whether a search warrant for premises includes the
right to search persons found there may still be an open one. Id. at 2590 n.4. Ybarra concerned a search warrant for a public tavern, and it is possible that a majority of the Court at
some future time might distinguish public areas from private premises when addressing this

issue.
226. See, for example, the cases basing fourth amendment standing on presence at the
time of the search, which Justice Rehnquist collects in a footnote to his majority opinion.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 145-46 n.13 (1978). Cases that base standing on property
interests are also now of doubtful precedential value. See notes 175-90 supra and accompanying text.

227.

See generally Ashdown, supra note 8.
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Rakas and Rawlings suggest that even this factor might not be relevant if the property is located in the basement, a closet, or a
dresser, and the owner is in the kitchen, unless the items have also
been placed in a footlocker or a suitcase.2 e It is unclear why the
owner of personal property left in a friend's home cannot claim a
privacy expectation in that home, at least when he is present, while
the homeowner, who is not present, can claim such an interest
when his friend's property is seized,2 9 unless "arcane property distinctions" really are the decisive considerations on fourth amendment issues.2 0
The Court's application of its new privacy formula to vehicles
is even more perplexing. Although the Court has held that persons
have only a diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles and
therefore are not protected by the warrant requirement, this holding does not apply when the articles seized from an automobile are
contained in a footlocker, suitcase, briefcase, purse, tool box, or
any "closed, opaque container". 3 1 In these situations a full, legitimate expectation of privacy attaches. 3 ' Whereas the results in the
privacy cases are clear, however, the distinctions among them are
not. Consider, for example, a U-Haul trailer or an enclosed top carrier for a vehicle.233 The trailer has wheels, and both the trailer
and the top carrier move about in the plain view of the public.
Nevertheless, a person cannot see inside either container, and
neither are subject to extensive state regulation. Similarly, a per228.

See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433

U.S. 1 (1977).
229. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). But see United States v.
DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979) (no privacy interest in
a wallet seized in plain view by agents voluntarily admitted to the home of a defendant who

disclaimed any interest in the articles seized).
230. The Court has repudiated the notion that "arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law" are controlling. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980);
Rakas v. llinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
231. In the term just concluded, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written by
Justice Stewart, expanded the Chadwick (footlocker) and Sanders (suitcase) holdings to
apply to any closed, opaque container. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981). In
Robbins the container in question consisted of two packages wrapped in green opaque
plastic, each of which contained 15 pounds of marijuana. Id. at 2844. It should be noted,
however, that if a custodial arrest of the occupants of an automobile precedes a warrantless
search of a closed container-whether it be a suitcase or a wrapped package-the search is
justified as incident to the arrest when the container is found anywhere in the passenger
compartment of the vehicle. New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).

232. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977).
233. These examples are suggested in Alschuler, Burger's Failure: Trying Too Much
to Lead, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 1980, at 19, col. 1.
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son cannot see inside an automobile trunk or a glove compartment,
and all four of these things are repositories of personal effects. In
each case, the owner of the vehicle has an interest in the area
searched and the right to exclude others. Notwithstanding these
similarities, however, it is almost impossible to predict whether the
Supreme Court would find a diminished or a fully legitimate expectation of privacy in the trailer and the top carrier. This uncertainty clearly indicates that the line of demarcation between diminished and legitimate privacy expectations is anything but
definitive.
The dividing line between diminished and nonexistent privacy
interests is even more ambiguous. It will be recalled that a majority of the Supreme Court in Rakas held that a passenger in an
automobile enjoys no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle in which he is riding and that, consequently, the fourth amendment does not apply to him. This conclusion may be supportable if
the passenger is either a hitchhiker or a friend or associate who
accompanies the driver in a trip across town. It makes little sense,
however, if the riders are family members 234 or the journey is a
long distance trip or vacation. 5
The status of the nonowner-driver is at least equally uncertain. If the owner is present in the vehicle, the driving function
should not alter the nonowner's status as a passenger whose rights
may depend upon his relationship with the owner and the nature
of their trip. If the owner is not present, however, the operator of
the vehicle would seem to be in the same position as the defendant
in Jones, whom the Court in Rakas suggested was entitled to an
expectation of privacy equivalent to that of the owner because he
had both a key and permission to use the apartment and was occupying it at the time of the search. There might be a different result, on the other hand, if the operator borrowed the car from the
owner merely to run a short errand. The rights of a car thief might
also depend on the tenure of his use and occupancy. 236 Moreover, if
234. See Pollard v. State, 388 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. 1979) (appellant had a privacy interest
in a parked car belonging to his wife); W. LAFAvE, 3 SEARCH AND SMzURz § 11.3, at 576-77
(1978).

235. The majority in Rakas does not reject the possibility that some passengers may
have a privacy interest in an automobile, see Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978), and
Justice Powell, concurring, clearly leaves open the possibility, id. at 152 n.1, 155 n.4 (Powell,

J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring).
236. See, e.g., United States v. Pitts, 588 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948
(1979); Gihsson v. United States, 406 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1969); Cotton v. United States, 371
F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965).
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the nonowner-driver does acquire an interest in the vehicle sufficient to establish some expectation of privacy in it, the question
then becomes whether the owner forfeits his privacy interest during this time. Analogizing to the conclusion in Alderman that an
absent homeowner retains his fourth amendment rights when the
property of another is seized, 3 7 it would seem that the owner does
in fact retain a privacy interest. The selective disclosure cases
might suggest the opposite conclusion, however, since they hold
that a person loses his expectation of privacy and sacrifices his
fourth amendment rights when he voluntarily discloses or conveys
something to another.2 8
Still another question that emerges from Rakas is why a paying passenger-for example, in a taxi-is protected by the fourth
amendment, whereas a gratuitous passenger is not. The proposition that the fourth amendment covers a passenger in a taxi
originated in Rios v. United States,2 s9 and Justice Rehnquist's attempt in Rakas to distinguish Rios on the ground that the property seized in the latter case belonged to the petitioner ' ° is contradicted by the conclusion in Rawlings that property interests are
not controlling. Thus, it would seem that Rakas and Rios are virtually indistinguishable.
The selective disclosure cases also provide little direction for
the police and the courts. Although the principle in these cases is
clear enough-voluntary disclosure destroys privacy expectations-its underlying rationale and application nevertheless are
perplexing. It contravenes common sense and logic to conclude
that a person forfeits his expectation of privacy in information
when he discloses it virtually out of necessity to a doctor, a lawyer,
or a prospective employer.2 4 ' Even if some other form of constitu-

tional or legal protection were available to a defendant in this situation, 2 it is farfetched to argue that the fourth amendment af237. See notes 173-74 supra and accompanying text.
238. This rationale may offer an explanation for the cases which hold that a person
has no expectation of privacy in personal property that is on someone else's premises or in
someone else's control. See notes 180-93 supra and accompanying text.
239. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
240. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 n.16 (1978).
241. See notes 119-43 supra and accompanying text.
242. The fifth amendment no longer provides protection. See Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463 (1976); cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (the fifth amendment applies "when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is

incriminating"). The sixth amendment may provide some protection in cases that deal with
information given to attorneys following the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings.
See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977);
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fords no safeguards against privacy invasions once there has been a
singular disclosure for a limited purpose. Furthermore, it is equally
strained to assert that the police can enter the office of a doctor, a
lawyer, or an employer to obtain information about a third party
without complying with fourth amendment requirements.2 43
Even the Supreme Court's recent attempt to provide some
clarity and consistency to its privacy decisions appears to be prob2 44 a case decided at the end of
lematic. In Robbins v. California,
the 1980-81 term, the Court addressed the issue whether the driver
of an automobile was entitled to an expectation of privacy in packages that had been wrapped in green opaque plastic and placed in
the car's recessed luggage compartment. Although the packages
were found following a legitimate stop and a probable cause search
of the vehicle, they were unwrapped without a search warrant.
Each package contained fifteen pounds of marijuana.245
In United States v. Chadwick 46 and Arkansas v. Sanders,2
the Supreme Court had recognized legitimate privacy expectations
in a footlocker and a suitcase, respectively, after characterizing the
articles as repositories of personal effects. 248 Thus, the government
quite understandably argued in Robbins that the fourth amendment protects only those containers used to transport personal effects. 249 A plurality of the Justices, however, rejected this argument
on two grounds. First, Justice Stewart's plurality opinion concluded that there was no basis in the language or meaning of the
fourth amendment to support the government's argument, since
the amendment protects people and places regardless of whether
they are "personal" or "impersonal. 2 50 Second, Justice Stewart
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Massiah
v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The attorney-client and physician-patient evidentiary
privileges also may apply. But see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402-14 (1976). See
also Privacy Act of 1974, § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
243. Of course a warrant would be required for the search to be constitutionally valid
against the doctor, lawyer, or employer. The fourth amendment does not, however, prevent
such a warrant-authorized search merely because the police are seeking evidence against
third parties. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). The point is that a search
which is invalid (e.g., because of a defective warrant) against the party with an interest in
the premises does not violate the fourth amendment rights of a patient, a client, or an
employee.
244. 101"S. Ct. 2841 (1981).
245. Id. at 2844.
246. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
247. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
248. 433 U.S. at 13; 442 U.S. at 762, 764.
249. 101 S.Ct. at 2845-46.
250. Id. at 2846.
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stated that it was virtually impossible to delineate any workable
criteria by which to distinguish containers designed to carry personal effects from containers designed for other purposes. 51 The
Court then held that a legitimate privacy expectation attaches to
any closed, opaque container and that a warrant is necessary to
conduct a valid search. 52
Robbins is significant because a plurality of the Court apparently tried to avoid tightly drawn distinctions in favor of a clear
rule of general applicability to cases in which the defendant claims
an expectation of privacy in a searched container. Ironically, however, this effort may have backfired precisely because of the rule's
lack of clarity. The term "closed, opaque container," although intended to delimit the parameters of protected privacy, does not
provide a workable standard by which such boundaries can be delineated. For example, a paper cup, an opaque bottle, a cigarette
package, a cardboard box, and a grocery bag are all opaque containers in some sense, but whether they are considered closed will
depend on the circumstances in which they are found. More importantly, in a great number of the cases in which such insubstantial
containers are a subject of controversy, no one will have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the containers' contents.2 53 Conse-

quently, the Robbins holding, although broader and more definitive than Chadwick and Sanders, suffers from the same lack of
clarity and imprecision that characterizes the Court's decisions in
other fourth amendment privacy cases.
In fact, the risk now exists that the failure of the Robbins
standard eventually may lead the Court to adopt an actual
"bright-line" rule that resembles the one formulated in the factually similar case of New York v. Belton,2 which was decided the
same day as Robbins. In Belton a majority of the Court held that
the entire interior of a vehicle, including any closed container
found in the passenger compartment, could be searched without a
warrant incident to the custodial arrest of the driver. Justice Stewart's majority opinion specified that "the justification for the
search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the
container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.
251.

Id.

252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 2847.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
Id. at 2864.

25

5

Although
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he referred to the functional needs of the police, 56 Justice Stewart
seemed concerned primarily with the need to interpret the searchincident-to-arrest standards of Chimel v. California5 7 in a way
that will provide law enforcement officials with a clear statement
25
on the permissible scope of a search following a vehicular arrest.

This interest in clarity ultimately may lead the Court to adopt
a similar approach in cases concerning the so-called "automobile
exception" to the warrant requirement. A bright-line rule that
could be applied easily would permit the warrantless search not
only of the vehicle itself but also of any containers found inside. In
fact, five Justices already either favor this view or are leaning in
that direction.2 59 Moreover, such a rule apparently can be adopted
without overruling Chadwick or Sanders, since in both of those
cases probable cause existed to search only the footlocker and suitcase, respectively. The automobile exception, therefore, was not
applicable.260
256. Justice Stewart's majority opinion states that "articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if
not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary item."' Id. The opinion then relies on United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973), for the proposition that the authority to search does not depend upon what a
court may later determine was the arrestee's actual ability to reach weapons or evidence.
Thus, the Court clearly has sanctioned the search of a vehicle after the arrestee has
been removed therefrom and placed in custody-with no real possibility of seizing anything
inside the car. Consequently, at least in cases that deal with vehicles, the Court has abandoned Chimel'sfunctional approach and now uses only its doctrinal underpinnings to define
an area that may be searched in all similar cases. See New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860,
2865-68 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
257. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
258. The Belton rule itself, however, proves less than clear. A question exists, for example, about how long after the defendant's arrest and removal the car may be searched.
Also, the Court's new rule permitting the post-arrest search of the interior of a vehicle--but
not the trunk-cannot be easily applied in cases that deal with hatchbacks, station wagons,
and vans. See 101 S. Ct. at 2689 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
259. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2851-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 2855-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766-68 (1979) (Burger, C.J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring). Although Chief Justice Burger concurred without opinion in Robbins, he apparently
did so because the scope of the "automobile exception" was not pressed by the parties, and,
more importantly, because he was unable to muster even a plurality for the view he expessed in Sanders. Id. Although Justice Powell expressed sympathy for an approach that
would permit the warrantless search of containers found in automobiles when probable
cause exists to search the vehicle, he declined to embrace it in Robbins. He rejected this
approach not only because it had not been pressed but also because he was unwilling to
undertake sua sponte reconsideration of the scope of the automobile exception so late in the
term. Powell noted, however, that some future case might provide such an opportunity. 101
S. Ct. at 2850-51.
260. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2855-59 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissent-
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The current confusing and paradoxical state of the law that is
applicable to the searches of containers found in vehicles makes
the eventual adoption of a bright-line rule even more probable. A
suitcase found in the backseat of a car, for example, can now be
searched without either a warrant or probable cause following the
custodial arrest of the driver;26 1 if there is not an arrest, however,
no amount of probable cause will justify a search regardless of
where the suitcase is found in the vehicle.6 Thus, the recent decisions in Robbins and Belton have done little to clarify the law in
this area and much to confuse it. Unfortunately, this confusion
may lead to a simple, though restrictive, solution in which privacy
interests are likely to be further sacrificed.
The morass created by the Supreme Court's application of its
privacy formula, then, has left the police and the courts without
much guidance in fourth amendment law. Although ambiguity is
an inherent element in the concept of privacy, the Court's tenuous
resolution of privacy issues in an effort to avoid the exclusionary
rule has needlessly complicated and confused the law of search and
seizure. The inconsistent results reached by lower courts in their
recent attempts to deal with the issues presented by electronic
tracking devices 263 and garbage searches 2 " are perhaps the best eving); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766-68 (1979) (Burger, C.J., joined by Stevens, J.,
concurring).
261. It should be noted that the Court specifically excluded the trunk of an automobile from the Belton holding. New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 n.4 (1981). Nevertheless, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion in Robbins, the Belton rule might
encourage custodial arrests when officers see something interesting inside a vehicle. See
Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2855-59 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In this way,
according to Stevens, it could conceivably grant the police greater authority to search than a
magistrate has to issue a warrant. Id.
262. See New York v. Belton, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2870 (1981) (White, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
263. Compare the cases holding the fourth amendment to apply to these devices, e.g.,
United States v. Michael, 29 CRiM.L. R'. (BNA) 2217 (5th Cir. May 11, 1981) (en banc);
United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978);
United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Mass. 1976), vacated on other
grounds sub noam. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 926 (1978) with cases in which no privacy expectation was recognized, e.g., United
States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
264. Compare United States v. Alden, 576 F.2d 772 (8th Cir.) (no fourth amendment
interest in trash pile), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855 (1978) and United States v. Shelby, 573
F.2d 971 (7th Cir.) (no legitimate expectation of privacy in garbage cans behind defendant's
garage), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978) with People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d
713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969) (fourth amendment applies to search of garbage cans within 2
to 3 feet of defendant's back door).
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idence of this unclear state of the law.
One notion that undoubtedly will filter down to police and the
courts, however, is the Supreme Court's current policy of restricting the scope of the fourth amendment to a narrow core of privacy
values. To be included in this restricted sphere of privacy, a privacy interest must be almost completely insulated from the public,
and precautions must be taken to maintain it. 6 5 If the interest is
imperfect, as in the case of an automobile, or is penetrated by even
minimal voluntary exposure, 26s at least some element of fourth
amendment protection is sacrificed, regardless of whether the interest is in information or property. 267 Indeed, the only privacy interests currently accorded full fourth amendment protection are
those that include both an interest in the area searched or the material seized and the legitimate exclusion of others. 68
This restrictive policy and the ambiguity created by its application are sure to undermine the impact of the exclusionary rule
on the police. For one thing, the new approach by its very nature is
uncertain and difficult to apply. Perhaps more important, how265. The Court has noted the importance of taking normal precautions to protect privacy. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152
(1978) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring); cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (locking personal effects in footlocker was manifestation of belief that
contents would be "free from public examination").
266. Four Justices have even suggested that negligent disclosure might be sufficient to
destroy privacy expectations. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 665 (1980) (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 599 F.2d 112 (6th Cir. 1979) (car lot open to
public); United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1979) (passenger in airplane); United
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978) (abandoned boat), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958
(1979); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.) (conversations overheard by FBI
agents in adjoining motel room), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); United States v. Eisler,
567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1977) (common hallways in apartment building). See also United
States v. Humphries, 636 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir.) (driveway of home), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
2324 (1980); Northside Realty Associate, Inc. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1979)
(public areas of business); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1979) (another person's boat); Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (telephone records of toll calls), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 949 (1979); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.) (information on outside of
mail), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); Marshall v. Western Waterproofing Co., 560 F.2d
947 (8th Cir. 1977) (scaffolding in public view); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th
Cir. 1976) (locked hallway in apartment building); United States v. Cruz Pagon, 537 F.2d
554 (1st Cir. 1976) (garage of condominium).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979) (backpack);
United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978) (briefcase); Gillard v. Schmidt, 579
F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (guidance counselor's desk); United States v. Diggs, 569 F.2d 1264
(3d Cir. 1977) (locked metal box left with relative); United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1977) (policeman's locker).
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ever, law enforcement officials gradually will become aware that
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts-the latter as a result of the filtering down process and the political climate-are inclined to resolve the ambiguities in their favor. This attitude of
leniency toward police practices, as well as the uncertainty of
fourth amendment application, will do little to engender respect
for fourth amendment values. It is likely, for example, that despite
Justice Powell's opinion to the contrary,2 69 the police now will act
even more aggressively toward automobiles. Even though police
conduct in searches of automobiles traditionally has been treated
more permissibly-formerly under the mobility theory-at least
probable cause was required to search a vehicle. Now, however, as
long as the police can justify a stop,

70

probable cause to search

generally is unnecessary when the vehicle has more than one occupant. This new concept, of course, compromises the rights of any
persons present who do have protected privacy expectations. Such
a scenario
in turn impairs the Court's own asserted deterrent pol27 1
icy

and, together with the restriction of the scope of the fourth

amendment, raises questions about the future viability of the exclusionary rule.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In an effort to aid local law enforcement by avoiding the application of the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court
has developed a graduated approach to the fourth amendment
based upon degrees of privacy expectations. This scheme basically
consists of three categories, with fourth amendment protection increasing as privacy interests become stronger. When the Court is
willing to recognize an expectation of privacy as legitimate, a warrant is required. If the Court concludes that the expectation is diminished, probable cause generally is required, 2 although a warrant is not. Most significantly, when the Court is unwilling to
recognize any privacy interest whatsoever, the fourth amendment
269. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 n.1 (1978) (Powell, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., concurring).
270. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3, 137 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
272. The demands of law enforcement may permit something less than probable cause
to suffice. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1 (1968).
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is inapplicable to the police practice in question. This graduated
standard is an obvious aid to law enforcement when the Court
finds privacy expectations to be diminished or nonexistent. Moreover, the Court has made a further effort to accommodate crime
control interests, and at the same time has exacerbated the administrative difficulties inherent in the privacy formula, 27 3 by applying
its scheme in a rather dubious fashion to avoid the imposition of
constitutional requirements and the exclusionary rule. In so doing
the Supreme Court has restricted the substantive scope of the
fourth amendment and has significantly reduced the central role
that the amendment formerly played in the criminal process.
While the Court was developing its restrictive privacy formula,
it simultaneously gave resolution of these issues back to the states
in Stone v. Powell.2 75 In Stone the Court held that if the state provided the defendant with a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
fourth amendment claim, then he was not entitled to federal
habeas corpus review of the fourth amendment issue. This decision
effectively insulated state court fourth amendment decisions from
federal review. The Supreme Court thus implemented a policy of
accommodating state law enforcement interests by limiting the impact of the exclusionary rule and by simultaneously relegating to
the states the issue of its application.
There is, however, a much more efficient way to implement
these twin goals and at the same time preserve sound fourth
amendment principles. The simple solution may be to overrule
Mapp v. Ohio.1 7 This step would refer the decision on the exclusionary remedy to the states without the imposition of a federal
rule. It also would alleviate the pressure on the federal courts to
view fourth amendment values narrowly and thereby avoid saddling state prosecutions with inadmissible evidence.2 77 The traditional federal exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States 78 would
remain as a control on federal law enforcement; more rigorous
standards are justified not only because of the sophistication of
federal agencies and the superior training of their agents, but also
273. Scholars generally have rejected the idea of a sliding scale approach to the fourth
amendment as unadministrable. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 376-77, 390-95; Kaplan,
supra note 14.
274. See generally Miles, supra note 8.
275. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
276. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
277. See Miles, supra note 8, at 75-80.
278. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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because the federal government does not face the same law enforcement problems-either in magnitude or variety-as do the
states. The primary reason for the recent demise in the fourth
amendment is the Supreme Court's unwillingness to apply the exclusionary rule to the actions of local law enforcement agents.
These officers must deal with a much higher volume of criminal
behavior than federal agents, and consequently their actions necessarily tend to be reactive and spontaneous compared with the more
deliberate federal investigations. 279 With the constitutional
straightjacket removed from the states, the Supreme Court then
would be free to return the fourth amendment to a respected and
central position in the criminal process.
This desire to free the states from a constitutional handicap
currently is working to undermine the policy of Mapp. Instead of
harmonizing state law with more demanding federal constitutional
standards, the uniformity dictated by Mapp is operating to dilute
the standards applicable to the federal government. Not surprisingly, Justice Harlan's concurrence in Williams v. Florida, as in
which the Court upheld Florida's use of six-person juries, stressed
this very point. To the extent that the Supreme Court restricts the
scope of the fourth amendment to avoid handicapping state law
enforcement with the exclusionary rule, federal agents also benefit.
In fact, a result entirely the opposite of that envisioned by Mapp
is occurring in some states. In these jurisdictions the state supreme
court has interpreted the state constitution to impose obligations
on the police beyond those that the fourth amendment requires;28 1
thus, in some states the standards ironically are more rigorous
than their federal counterpart.
Retention of the exclusionary rule cannot be justified on the
ground that it addresses the political problem of the substantive
279. Justice Harlan's dissent emphasized this point in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
678-83 (1961) (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., and Whittaker, J., dissenting).
280. 399 U.S. 78, 117-43 (Harlan, J., concurring).
281. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975) (custodial searches); State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (custodial
searches); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (consensual searches); State v.
Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (inventory searches). See also State v. Wanrow, 88
Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (statute prohibiting electronic surveillance); Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977);
Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REv. 873 (1976); Wilkes, The New Federalismin CriminalProcedure:State Court Evasion
of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure,63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975); Note, Stepping Into the Breach:Basing Defendants'
Rights on State Rather Than Federal Law, 15 AM. Camm. L. REv. 339 (1978).
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scope of the criminal law. That the rule historically has had its
greatest application in victimless crime-for example, drugs and
gambling-does not mean that it significantly reduces prosecutions
and convictions for these offenses. Moreover, its deterrent impact
on police practices aimed at these crimes is at best doubtful, 282 and
it at least encourages police perjury.283 Drawing a distinction between serious and victimless crimes, and applying the rule only to
Such a
the latter as a political compromise, is unsatisfactory.2
distinction raises serious equal protection problems and is administratively unmanageable.
Whatever its impact on victimless crime, the desire for retention of Mapp's exclusionary rule currently is outweighed by its
negative impact on fourth amendment values. Only by removing
the constitutional straightjacket from the states will the Supreme
Court free itself to return the fourth amendment to a respected
and governing position in the criminal process. Furthermore, a
remain applicable to
broader view of the fourth amendment would
285
Colorado.
v.
Wolf
of
virtue
the states by
It can be argued that this proposal would leave fourth amendment rights without a remedy. The states, however, would be free
to adopt their own exclusionary rules, and there is no reason to

suppose that most would refuse to do S0.288 Indeed, states would be
more likely to adopt their own exclusionary rule than they would
be to interpret their constitutional provisions inconsistently with
similar federal provisions. In any event, a remedy is superfluous
unless there are rights to vindicate, and that seems to be where the
Supreme Court currently is headed.
It is of course difficult to predict with precision whether a majority of the Court would adopt a different attitude toward the
fourth amendment if the federal exclusionary rule were eliminated.
282.

See, e.g., D. HORowrrz, THE CouRTS AND SociAL POLICY 223-24 (1977); Oaks,

supra note 17; Spiotto, supra note 17.
283. See D. HoRowrrz, supra note 282, at 234.
284. See Kaplan, supra note 14, at 1046-49.
285. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Supreme Court in Wolf made the fourth amendment
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court stated that "we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction, such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 28.
286. Prior to Wolf, almost two-thirds of the states were opposed to the use of the
exclusionary rule. Even though the Wolf Court declined to extend the rule to the states,
more than half of the states passing on the question between Wolf and Mapp nevertheless
adopted some form of exclusionary remedy. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961)
(citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 app. (1960)).
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From a more pragmatic standpoint, it is also somewhat questionable whether the Court even would review as many fourth amendment cases as it now does. Moreover, the incentive for state litigants to raise search and seizure claims in the criminal process
would be reduced significantly if the particular state had not
adopted its own exclusionary remedy for fourth amendment violations. Nevertheless, assuming an adequate opportunity for review-at least in federal cases-the Court may well change its perspective on search and seizure questions in the absence of a
"constitutional straightjacket" that is imposed on the states. 117 If
some states would then adopt either their own exclusionary provisions or some other viable remedy, the criminal process ultimately
may be better off, at least in terms of overall constitutional control
over police search and seizure practices.

287. Justice Rehnquist has impliedly suggested that the Court might be more favorably inclined toward fourth amendment claims if the shackles of the exclusionary rule were
removed from the states. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2851-55 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

